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ABSTRACT
MODELING THE DECISION PROCESS OF
A JOINT TASK FORCE COMMANDER
John Anthony Sokolowski
Old Dominion University, 2003
Director: Dr. Mikel D. Petty
The U.S. military uses modeling and simulation as a tool to help meet its warfighting needs. A key element within military simulations is the ability to accurately
represent human behavior. This is especially true in a simulation’s ability to emu
late realistic military decisions. However, current decision models fail to provide the
variability and flexibility that human decision makers exhibit. Further, most decision
models are focused on tactical decisions and ignore the decision process of senior mil
itary commanders at the operational level of warfare. In an effort to develop a better
decision model th at would mimic the decision process of a senior military commander,
this research sought to identify an underlying cognitive process and computational
techniques th at could adequately implement it. Recognition-Primed Decision making
(RPD) was identified as one such model that characterized this process. Multiagent
system simulation was identified as a computational system th at could mimic the cog
nitive process identified by RPD. The result was a model of RPD called RPD Agent.
Using an operational military decision scenario, decisions produced by RPDAgent
were compared against decisions made by military officers. It was found that RPDA
gent produced decisions that were equivalent to its human counterparts. RPDAgent’s
decisions were not optimum decisions, but decisions th at reflected the variability in
herent in those made by humans in an operational military environment.
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1
1.1

INTRODUCTION

T h e sis S ta te m e n t

Multiagent system simulation technology can be used to implement the cognitive
decision-making process described by the Recognition-Primed Decision model. Fur
ther, one can employ this implementation to model the decisions made by a Joint
Task Force Commander at the operational level of warfare.

1.2

P ro b le m S ta te m e n t

To maintain its warfighting capability, the United States Department of Defense
(DoD) must train its personnel; it must continue to analyze and refine its war plans
and operating strategy; it must design, procure, and test new weapons systems; and
it must experiment with new warfare concepts to maintain its military advantage in
a rapidly changing world. The cost to accomplish these tasks on a recurring basis, in
terms of using actual combat personnel and equipment, has become prohibitive [1].
To reduce personnel and operational costs, DoD has sought to replace many of these
tests and exercises involving live equipment and personnel with computer simulation.
To ensure effective results in the above areas, these simulation systems must accu
rately portray the battlespace. Included in the simulated battlespace are not only
the physical equipment such as tanks and airplanes, but also the humans who must
make many decisions in the course of carrying out their warfare responsibilities.
Human behavior representation (HER) in military simulations has received much
attention ever since the National Research Council published its comprehensive re
view of HER modeling in military simulation systems [2].1 This review covered many
aspects of HER including individual and group behavior, human decision-making,
memory and learning, situational awareness, and planning. Germane to this research
1Citation and reference list format for this manuscript are taken from the journal SIM ULATION:
Transactions of the Society fo r Modeling and Sim ulation International.
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were their findings in the area of decision modeling. Specifically, they found th at deci
sion models within military simulations were too stereotypical and too homogeneous.
In their words:
“First, the decision process is too stereotypical, predictable, rigid, and
doctrine limited, so it fails to provide realistic characterization of the
variability, flexibility, and adaptability exhibited by a single entity across
many episodes. Variability, flexibility, and adaptability are essential for ef
fective decision making in a military environment . .. Second, the decision
process in previous models is too uniform, homogeneous, and invariable,
so it fails to incorporate the role of such factors as stress, fatigue, experi
ence, aggressiveness, impulsiveness, and attitudes toward risk, which vary
widely across entities.”
The shortfall in military decision modeling is especially evident at the operational
level of warfare.2 While many decision models exist for the tactical level of warfare,
very few military simulations model any type of decision-making at the operational
level. Most obvious is the lack of a model for the decision-making of senior military
commanders such as the commander of a Joint Task Force (C JT F).3 In simulation ex
ercises, human role players make C JT F decisions and then manipulate the simulation
system to carry out orders generated by the decisions. In a large military exercise
where simulation is the primary representation of military forces in the field, several
hundred role players are required to produce and to carry out these decisions. This
manpower requirement significantly adds to the cost of an exercise [5].
2There are three levels of warfare within the U.S. military. The strategic level of warfare refers
to national military objectives and theater war plans. The operational level of warfare is concerned
with planning, conducting, and sustaining campaigns and major operations to achieve strategic
objectives. The level at which battles and engagements are planned and executed is called the
tactical level of warfare [3].
3A Joint Task Force Commander is typically a two or three star admiral or general from one
of the military services who commands military forces from two or more services that are jointly
working to achieve military objectives [4].
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One reason th at an adequate decision model for a senior military commander is
not available is the lack of a complete understanding of how people make decisions.
Michael Bauman, Director of the Army Training and Doctrine Command Analysis
Center put it this way: “We cannot represent how humans make decisions. If we
understood how people make decisions, we could tailor simulations and training to
enhance people’s abilities [6].”
To solve this decision modeling problem, much research has been conducted not
only on how humans make decisions, but also on how to represent the decision-making
process in a computational form. A survey of this research is presented in Section 2 of
this manuscript. This dissertation furthers decision modeling research by developing
a computational model of the decision process of a C JTF based on cognitive decision
theory and multiagent system simulation techniques. It is im portant to note th at this
model is not intended to produce optimum decisions for a given situation (although it
may). Instead, it is meant to mimic a hum an’s cognitive decision process and thereby
produce realistic and possibly suboptimum decisions.

1.3

M otivation

This portion of the dissertation serves two purposes. First, it describes the role of a
C JT F in modern warfare so the reader has a clear understanding of why C JTF deci
sions are im portant. Second, it draws on the C JT F ’s role to explain the motivation
behind developing a computational model of his4 decision process.

1.3.1

Joint d octrin e and th e C JT F

The Goldwater/Nichols Act of 1986 [7] mandated th a t U.S. warfare at all levels no
longer be fought along separate Service (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps)
lines.

Instead, U.S. military operations would be “joint” , combining forces from

4Throughout this paper “he” and “his” are not gender specific but refer to both sexes.
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different services to suit the situation. This was a significant shift in the way U.S.
forces would carry out their wartime missions. Before Goldwater/Nichols, a military
commander had no operational forces directly assigned to him. He had to request
support and permission to carry out his wartime tasks from each Service. After this
congressional act, a C JT F was given direct command authority over those forces.
To illustrate this dramatic shift, consider the command structure for the invasion
of Panama, which was the first significant U.S. military action to employ the new
Joint Task Force (JTF) organization. General Maxwell Thurman, Commander of the
U.S. Southern Command, took advantage of his power under the Goldwater/Nichols
act to select Lieutenant General Carl W. Stiner, U.S. Army, and the Commander of
the X VIIIth Airborne Corps, to command a JT F of 22,000 Soldiers, 3,400 Airmen,
900 Marines, and 700 Sailors. The result was a force with unity of command and good
interoperability, which would rapidly achieve its operational objectives of protecting
U.S. citizens in Panam a and maintaining the Panam a Canal free of Noriega’s control
[8].

To further joint concepts, U.S. Joint Forces Command, which evolved from the
U.S. Atlantic Command, was assigned the mission of developing joint doctrine for the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was tasked to train C JTFs and their staffs
in the area of joint warfare [4, 9].
JTFs, made up of forces from two or more services, are now formed to handle
most types of military operations, from peacekeeping to major theater war. A JT F
exists long enough to accomplish its assigned mission and to transition control back
to civil or political authorities. Its size varies depending on the assigned mission.
At the head of a JT F is the CJTF. He is charged by the National Command
Authority (President, Secretary of Defense, and theater commander) to translate
strategic guidance into operational level warfighting decisions. He is supported in his
planning and decision-making by a JT F staff composed of hundreds of officers and
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enlisted personnel who are drawn from each Service. A C JT F can come from any
of the Services but he will have been specifically trained in joint warfare policy and
doctrine. The JT F staff provides the operational planning support and situational
assessment necessary to enable the C JTF to make military decisions that tip the scale
of victory in his favor.
A C JT F makes hundreds of decisions in the course of his assignment as the leader
of a JT F . These decisions span a large domain from those of a strategic nature to those
of an operational type. At times, they even venture into the tactical area although
tactical decisions are not usually the norm. He is assisted with his decision-making by
the JT F staff. One of the staff’s jobs is to develop multiple courses of action (COAs)
for the C JT F to consider before choosing the most appropriate one. For example,
suppose a C JTF is faced with the decision of when to conduct an amphibious assault.
His staff may propose the following COAs:
• COA 1: Attack immediately to gain the element of surprise even though only
85% of the required troops are in place to support the assault. The staff judges
this as an acceptable risk.
® COA 2: Wait 96 hours until 95% of the troops arrive. Intelligence estimates
th at there is a 50% chance the enemy will be alerted to the assault by th at
point.
• COA 3: Build up additional forces over the next week to 100% strength and
keep the enemy guessing as to when the assault will occur.
This decision is typical of those th a t a C JT F faces. Joint doctrine specifies a
methodical approach to developing these COAs [4]. COA development generates
and examines two or more solutions to a problem, establishes the pros and cons of
each solution, and makes a recommendation to the C JT F on which COA to choose.
However, there is no doctrine or training for the C JT F on how to choose the best
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COA. How he makes the decision is left up to his years of military experience and his
personal assessment of the situation. Modeling this personal decision process is the
subject of this dissertation.

1.3.2

M o tiv a tio n for m o d elin g th e C J T F

The U.S. military relies heavily on constructive simulations5 to train its JT F staffs and
their supporting Service components. Unfortunately, they only receive training about
once every two years. These staffs and the C JT F are drawn from the Services. The
commander th at would normally act as the C JT F has many other duties th at must
be carried out, which precludes him from being available to conduct JT F training on
a regular basis. If a computer model of a C JTF existed, then the staffs would be able
to conduct JT F training more frequently because the computer could play the role
of the C JT F when he was not available.
Besides training, military simulations are used for COA analysis and for experi
menting with new warfighting doctrine.6 To achieve realistic analysis and to validate
new doctrinal concepts, a C JTF decision model must produce decisions th at are typ
ical of an experienced C JTF as opposed to generating non-doctrinal or artificially
optimized decisions. As noted earlier, military simulations have not measured up to
this demand. Because of this, the quality of simulation-based training, analysis, and
experimentation has suffered [6, 11, 12], The military community would greatly ben
efit from improved models of C JT F decision-making within constructive simulations.
5A constructive simulation can be thought of as one or more computer-generated forces acting
against other computer-generated forces as opposed to a virtual simulation where a human interacts
with computer entities. For example, a flight simulator, where a real pilot flies a simulated aircraft,
is a virtual simulation. A computer war game where one set of computer-generated entities fights
against another set is considered a constructive simulation [10].
6Training simulations take the place of live military forces so that a commander can train a
CJTF and his staff at a reduced cost and with more robustness than if live forces were used.
Analytical simulations are used to help refine war plan scenarios, to predict the outcome of specific
military maneuvers, and to conduct mission rehearsals for pending operations. Simulation supports
experimentation by providing a venue for testing new warfighting concepts.
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1.4

A p p ro a c h

This research formally sets forth an architecture for a multiagent system (MAS)
simulation th a t implements the cognitive decision process described by RecognitionPrimed Decision (RPD) Making as used by a CJTF. RPD was evaluated as the
cognitive decision model closest to representing the C JT F decision process. RPD has
as its base the premise th at a decision maker, who is an expert in his area, relies
heavily on his past experience to interpret a current decision situation, to recognize,
in an intuitive manner, what decision must be made, and then to assess th at decision
to ensure it fits the context of the current situation.
RPD attem pts to capture the intuitive interactions th at go on inside the human
brain as decision situations are being evaluated. The RPD process was captured
with a MAS design, hereafter known as RPDAgent, by using agents to simulate the
various steps involved in RPD. The agents within the simulation interact to assess
the situation, draw on past experience to produce potential decisions, and evaluate
those decisions against competing goals th at must be satisfied.
Capturing an expert’s past experience was a crucial part of implementing RPD
in a computational form. A data structure was developed to represent the key con
cepts of the decision recognition process, to capture a hum an’s internalization and
interpretation of his environment, and to represent a personal evaluation process of
potential decisions against the goals th at he is trying to achieve.
For a model to produce credible results, it must be validated. RPDAgent was
validated using a decision scenario typical of the types of decisions facing a CJTF.
The scenario was provided to a group of senior military officers, each playing the role
of a CJTF. The same decision scenario was provided to RPDAgent. The set of role
player decisions was then statistically compared to the model decision set to evaluate
validity. As a final measure of validity, a set of role player decisions and a set of model
decisions were presented to senior military officers who had previously commanded
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a JTF. They were asked to distinguish between the model results and the human
results.
The approach described above was intended to produce a model capable of mim
icking the decision process of a senior military commander. The model was not meant
to produce optimized decisions, but rather to follow, as closely as possible, the some
times imperfect decisions produced by humans who are the experts in their field.

1.5

C on tributions

This dissertation provides a new approach to modeling the cognitive decision process
of a decision maker experienced in his particular decision domain. The following are
the specific contributions of this research:
• A computational model of the RPD process capable of mimicking decisions
made by experts in their field. It is not limited to the military domain.
• A d ata structure capable of modeling a person’s past situational experience,
of capturing a hum an’s internalization and interpretation of his environment,
and of capturing personal preferences for evaluating potential decisions against
possibly conflicting goals.
• A model capable of explaining its reasoning process rather than produce a “black
box-type” decision with no explanation of how the decision was made.
• An experimentally validated implementation of a model of C JTF decision
making for a class of operational decisions.

1.6

D issertation O rganization

The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows:
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• S ection 2. Background. This section surveys research on decision theory,
m ilitary decision-making, and computational methods available to implement
cognitive decision model. Work th at is most relevant is described in detail.
• S ection 3. Research. P roject. This section provides an in depth description
of the research including project design, validation methodology, data analysis,
and research results.
• S ection 4.

C onclusions and Future W ork. This dissertation concludes

with a summary of the research results and a description of follow on work th at
could be undertaken to expand upon the basis of this effort.
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2

BACKGROUND

This section provides a survey of past research relevant to this dissertation. It begins
with a review of pertinent decision theory research and is followed by a description
of the decision process currently employed by the military. It ends with a compre
hensive evaluation of techniques available to implement cognitive decision models in
a computational form.
2.1

D ecision th eory

This part describes the research th a t has taken place to model decision-making. It
begins with a review of classical decision theory and its associated concepts. It is
followed by discussion of a competing theory called Naturalistic Decision Theory.
These two theories are the leading models of the human decision process.

2.1.1

C lassical decision th eory

People in all walks of life have realized the importance of the decisions they make. This
is especially true where high stakes decisions are prevalent such as in the military, law
enforcement, and the medical field. Much research has been devoted to understanding
the human decision process. Classical decision theory is the result of many efforts.
Classical decision theory is the collection of axiom-based models of uncertainty,
risk, and utility th at provides a method to make an optimal decision from among an
array of choices. The underlying model and its explicit rule th a t maximizes a deci
sion maker’s payoff defines optimality. Two mathematical models have characterized
classical decision theory, one of uncertainty and risk called expected value theory, and
one of utility, which includes subjective expected utility and m ulti-attribute utility
theory [13]. Both models had their origins in the economical and statistical methods th a t von Neumann and Morgenstern used to describe optimal decision making in
these fields [14], These models do not concentrate on the outcome of the decision but
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$5000
Stock market

Success (0.8)
Failure (0.2)

Savings

$2200
( 1 .0 )

F ig u re 1. Decision under risk
rather on the logical process used to derive the decision. These models assume th at
a decision maker always acts in a logical or rational manner. Therefore, the formulas
associated with these theories will always produce mathematically optimal decisions
with respect to the available information.
Decisions under risk strictly use probability to calculate the optimal decision.
They are most often described using monetary decision examples [15]. Figure 1 shows
a classic decision tree used to represent a decision under risk. The decision is whether
to invest a certain amount of money in the stock market or place the money into a
savings account. The example shows th a t if the decision is made to place the money
in a savings account, there is a sure payoff of $2200. If the money is invested in the
stock market, there is a certain probability of either receiving $5000 or completely
losing the investment. To calculate the payoff of this decision, one uses the expected
value method.

Expected value — (0.8) (5000) + (0.2) (0) = $4000

Therefore, the logical decision would be to invest the money in the stock market with
an expected payoff of $4000.
The above example is purely a probabilistic calculation. It does not take into
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account a decision maker’s personal risk tolerance. Even with a probability of 0.8,
an individual may not be willing to take the chance of loosing all his investment.
However, expected value calculations do not account for personal risk tolerance.
Von Neumann and Morgenstern [14] saw this shortcoming in expected value theo
ry. To account for personal risk, they transformed decision outcomes or consequences
into utilities. A utility is a personal assessment of how much a particular payoff is
worth to an individual, not in terms of money, but in terms of a numerical scale
from 0 to 1. Thus, Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) Theory came to include both
subjective probabilities about the uncertainty of an outcome and a decision maker’s
propensity for risk for th a t outcome. Each decision maker has a unique function th at
assigns a utility to each possible outcome of the decision for every decision he faces.
Combining this function with a subjective probability of an outcome yields an SEU
value:

SEU[Ai] = Y , pikU(Ck)

( 1)

k
where [AJ is a particular alternative and Pn~ is the subjective probability of encoun
tering consequence Ck given alternative A*. Using the example of Figure 1, stock
market and savings are the two alternatives. If the stock market alternative A \ is
chosen, then there are two possible consequences: getting $5000 (Cu), or losing all
money (C 2 ). The probability of receiving $5000 given th at the stock market was
chosen (Pn) is 0.8. A similar statem ent can be made for the failure event. The
SEU function is very similar to the one used in calculating expected value. They are
equivalent if the utility function and the value function are identical.
The shape of an individual’s utility function describes his propensity for risk for
a given decision. For any point on the function, a person’s attitude toward risk is
formally defined by the coefficient of risk aversion [16]:

r =kM
“

u'(ct)
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U(x)

Risk averse

F ig u re 2. Utility function
T a b le 1. Example utility values
Choices
Stock Market
Savings

Probability (Fife)
0.8
1.0

Payoff(Cfc)
$5000
$2200

Utility (F(Cfc))
0.90
0.75

where U' (Ck) and U"(Ck) are the first and second derivatives of the utility function.
If Cra < 0 then a person is risk averse; if C ra > 0, a person is said to be risk seeking.
Figure 2 depicts a risk averse utility function. To illustrate the effect of personal risk
bias, the monetary outcomes from the above example will be replaced by the decision
maker’s utility value for each of those outcomes.
Table 1 contains these values for this decision. Using equation (1) to calculate
SEU for the stock market choice verses the savings choice yields:

S E U (stock m arket)

=

(0.8)(0.9) + (0.2)(0) = 0.72

SE U (savings)

=

(1.0)(0.75) = 0.75

with the decision maker being risk averse, even though the expected value indicates
the stock market is the appropriate choice, he is not willing to risk the loss of a sure
$2200. Other decision makers may have different utility functions and thus can arrive
at different conclusions. Under utility theory, the payoffs or consequences need not
be monetary. One can just as easily map qualitative results to utility values and
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calculate an SEU.
M ultiattribute Utility Theory (MAUT) is an extension of SEU th at takes into
account multiple objectives of a decision maker [17]. In the above stock market
example, the decision maker was only concerned with one payoff or consequence
value. The utility function had only one independent variable to map to a utility.
W ith MAUT, the utility function can accept multiple variables to calculate a utility
value. For example, a decision maker may be concerned with soldier safety, mission
accomplishment, and equipment losses. In the simplest case, the utility function
would be a weighted addition of individual utility values given by:

u(x 1 . . . X n) =

Yl knUn(xn)

(3)

71

where each constant kn is a weighting factor for each un. More complex utility
functions can be readily constructed.

They are useful when two or more utility

variables are interdependent.
Classical decision theory assumes th a t decisions are made in a prescriptive manner.
By prescriptive it is meant th at a decision maker always makes decisions in a rational
way. Assumed in this concept is th a t classical decision theory is descriptive of how
humans actually make decisions. However, as shown by Kahneman and Tver sky [18],
decision makers rarely behave in a prescriptive manner. They conducted a controlled
set of experiments where subjects were given several problems requiring them to make
a decision between two payoffs. For example:
In the first problem, the m ajority of the subjects chose option B (82%). From
SEU, this choice implies the following inequality:

w(2400) > .33u(2500) + .66^(2400) or .34u(2400) > ,33u(2500)
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T ab le 2. Kahneman decision experiment
Problem 1
Choice A
$2500 with probability .33
$2400 w ith probability .66
$0 with probability .01
[18%]
Problem 2
Choice C
$2500 with probability .33
$0 with probability .67
[83%]

Choice B
$2400 with certainty

[82%]

Choice D
$2400 with probability .34
$0 with probability .66
[17%]

In the second problem, the utility calculation is as follows:

,33«(2500) > .34^(2400)

Behaving prescriptively, a decision maker would have made a decision consistent
with the utility of the given payoff. However, as shown by this example and several
others in Kahneman and Tversky’s study, decisions made by humans do not usually
match the decisions calculated by the formulas. Klein reported similar results in his
study of decision makers who were experts in their fields [19]. If this is the case, then
classical decision theory does not completely describe how humans make the majority
of their decisions.
Subjective probabilities play a significant role in SEU and MAUT calculations.
Each decision maker assigns his or her own estimated probabilities to the outcomes
of a decision problem in a manner similar to the way they assign their own utilities
to those outcomes. These probabilities are based on the person’s belief of the like
lihood of the outcome relative to the other outcomes. Tver sky and Kahneman [20]
showed that people employ a small set of heuristics, which help reduce the complex
task of assessing probabilities to simpler judgmental processes. Unfortunately, these
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heuristics often reflect biases th at subconsciously enter into the estimates and render
them less th an optimal.
The first heuristic they described is called representativeness, which helps estimate
the probability th a t an event or object A belongs to group B. Here, people have a
tendency to estimate membership based on a comparison to a stereotype representa
tion of a group. They ignore prior probabilities of outcomes, disregard the effect of
sample size, do not take into account the underlying random processes, base results
on irrelevant favorable of unfavorable descriptions, rely on illusions of validity rather
than on verifiable facts, and do not understand the concept of regression to the mean.
The second heuristic employed to simplify probability estimation is availability,
which Tversky and Kahneman defined as “. .. the ease with which instances or occur
rences can be brought to mind.” The easier it is for a person to imagine representative
cases, the easier it is for him to estimate a probability of occurrence. But, this heuris
tic can also lead to biases. The biases may be due to how easily an instance my be
retrieved, the effectiveness of a search set, the decision maker’s ability to imagine solu
tion sets, and illusionary correlation or overestimation of the frequency of occurrence
of naturally associated objects or processes.
The final heuristic is adjustment from the anchor or estimating an outcome based
on its deviation from an initial state called the anchor. Biases here include insufficient
adjustment and biases in the evaluation of conjunctive and disjunctive events. Studies
have shown th at people have a tendency to overestimate the probability of conjunctive
events and underestimate the probability of disjunctive events.
So while decision makers employ heuristics to help generate subjective probabili
ties associated with decision outcomes, the rules they follow have unsuspected biases
th at could lead to less than optimal decisions.
This section has reviewed the tenets of classical decision theory including expected
value theory, SEU, and MAUT. These theories provided a normative and a prescrip
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tive model for human decision-making. This theory assumed th at all people made
decisions in a logical and rational manner. However, decision makers more often than
not behaved non-rationally. T hat is, they did not make decisions in the manner pre
scribed by this theory. There must be other underlying decision behaviors th at affect
the human decision process. Additionally, when estimating subjective probabilities
associated with classical decision theory, one uses heuristics. Various factors can bias
the probability estimates of these heuristics, leading to less than optimal decisions.

2.1.2

N atu ralistic decision m aking

This section will introduce Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) as a theory th at
describes the process used by experienced decision makers to arrive at satisfactory
decisions. Unlike classical decision theory, it is not based on a mathematical process
for computing optimal outcomes but on a psychological model of the intuitive steps
a person follows in reaching a decision.
As was shown in the previous section, classical decision theory is centered on the
decision event. The decision event included two or more courses of action (COAs)
or choices and their associated subjective probabilities and utilities.

It does not

account for the decision maker’s past experiences or how proficient he is at analyzing
situations. In scenarios requiring rapid decisions, a person may not have time to
evaluated multiple COAs, let alone generate them.
Indeed, evidence strongly suggests th at experienced decision makers do not employ
classical decision methods for the majority of their decisions [19, 21, 22, 23]. Instead,
their approach to decision making differs from the classical method in at least three
ways:
• Experienced decision makers expend a significant effort in assessing the situation
presented.
• They evaluate only a single option but look at different aspects of th at option
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through mental simulation.
• A choice or option is accepted if it is satisfactory but not necessarily optimal.
The idea of satisficing vice optimizing decisions was first studied by Herbert Simon, a
Nobel Prize winner in economics who observed how those in business made decisions
[24, 25]. His work showed th a t most experienced business people chose alternatives
th at produced satisfactory, rather than optimal, outcomes because exact solutions to
complex problems were most likely not attainable. He called the concept of simplifying
problems to a level where one could obtain a solution bounded rationality. In addition,
most decisions made by experienced decision makers are embedded in a series of tasks
working towards a larger goal th at is heavily dependent on the situation context.
These tasks help define the situation and provide a framework in which a decision is
made. The features of these tasks and a decision maker’s knowledge and experience
relative to the tasks govern decision performance [26].
As described above, decisions take place in naturalistic settings, i.e. situations th at
people face in daily life th at cannot and should not be separated from the context
th at defines them. NDM is a theory th at models a person’s mental decision process
in his natural environment. NDM has been formally defined as the way people use
their experience to make decisions in field settings [27].
Researchers have identified eight factors th at most often appear in naturalistic
decision settings [26]. A decision maker is likely to employ the naturalistic process to
arrive at a decision when one or more of these factors are present. These factors are:
• Ill-structured problems.
• Uncertain dynamic environments.
• Shifting, ill-defined, or competing goals.
® Action/ feedback loops.
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• Time stress.
• High stakes.
• Multiply players.
• Organizational goals and norms.
These factors help characterize a naturalistic decision situation and bear further
explanation. The first three factors describe the ambiguity a person may face when
confronted with a decision. A person may expend considerable thought just trying to
understand the nature of the problem and gain insight into the context in which the
problem exists. This is known as developing situational awareness7 of the problem
at hand. Understanding the decision situation may be complicated by an environ
ment th at is changing or one where the decision maker has incomplete or imperfect
information. An end state or goal th at is unclear or th at is dynamically shifting may
further complicate the decision problem.
The fourth factor attests to the idea th at a decision is rarely just one event.
There may be several decisions th a t are needed to reach a specific goal. Each one
may influence the subsequent ones. Also, as a person gains situational awareness of a
problem, the knowledge gained acts as feedback to help the decision maker to realize
a satisfactory choice.
Time stress and high stakes are significant characteristics of naturalistic decision
situations. Time pressure, in particular, forces a person to take what is known about
a problem, match it with similar situations encountered in the past, and make a
decision based on the outcome of a previous experience. This sequence is the heart
of NDM.
7Situational awareness and situational assessment are sometimes used interchangeably. Howev
er, in this manuscript, situational awareness is defined as a state of knowledge while situational
assessment is the process by which that knowledge is achieved [2].
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The last two factors indicate the NDM encompasses group decision processes
where organizational rather than personal goals influence the decision outcome. In
dividual team members may bring unique insight to a problem, which adds to the
group situational awareness. The collective experience of the group can then lead to
a decision th a t satisfies the situation.
The NDM theory can be characterized as a decision cycle where the decision
maker assesses the situation, formulates a single COA, and tests the COA through
a mental simulation process to check its outcome. If modifications to the COA are
necessary, he makes them and rechecks the outcome. The cycle continues until the
decision maker is satisfied th at his chosen COA will solve the problem at hand. This
decision cycle relies on the decision maker’s ability to use his past experiences to
recognize what action to take.

2.1.3

R ecogn ition -P rim ed D ecision M od el

A naturalistic decision model th at encapsulates this recognition principle is the Recog
nition-Primed Decision Model (RPD) put forth by Klein [21]. RPD elaborates on
the naturalistic decision cycle to describe the cognitive process decision makers go
through to arrive at a COA. There are seven features th a t set the RPD model apart
from classical decision models [22]. They are:
• RPD focuses on situational assessment rather than comparing several decision
options.
• RPD describes how people use their experience8 to arrive at a decision.
• RPD asserts th at an experienced decision maker can identify a satisfactory COA
as the first one he considers rather than treating option generation as a random
process.
8Experience includes the periodic situational encounters that reinforce a person’s knowledge and
any training that he may receive to improve his expertise.
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• RPD relies on satisficing rather than optimizing—finding the first COA th at
works rather than the optimal one.
• RPD focuses on sequential evaluation of COAs rather than on the simultaneous
comparison of several options.
• RPD asserts th at experienced decision makers use mental simulation to assess
a COA rather than comparing the strengths and weaknesses of several COAs.
• RPD allows the decision maker to be more quickly prepared to initiate action
by committing to a COA being evaluated rather than waiting until all COAs
are compared.
Decision makers tend to employ RPD in the following situations [19]:
• When time pressure for a decision is great, because only one COA is analyzed
at a time and an optimum solution is not necessarily sought.
• W hen the decision maker is experienced in the decision domain. He has more
life experiences to match against to recognize the situation and to choose a
satisfactory COA.
• When the decision situation is more dynamic and changes before an analytical
decision analysis can be performed.
• When goals are ill-defined, which makes it difficult for the decision maker to
determine solution evaluation criteria.
These four situations have a direct relationship to the eight factors th at characterize
NDM, indicating th at the RPD process is a valid example of NDM.
Figure 3 depicts Klein’s model [19] of the RPD process. The process begins with
the decision maker experiencing the situation and determining if it is familiar. If the
situation is not familiar, he seeks clarification of the situation (improved situational
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awareness) until he is able to match it with a similar experience. Once he recognizes
the situation, he will be aware of four byproducts of this recognition: goals, cues, ex
pectancies, and actions. He will be able to visualize an end state. If events contradict
expectancies, the decision maker may reexamine his understanding of the situation.
Once expectancies are consistent with the unfolding events, he will examine possible
actions one by one. This is another key point of RPD. These options are not com
pared against one another but are evaluated on their own merits. Klein observed
th at experienced decision makers handled approximately 50 to 80 percent of all de
cisions in this manner [21]. As each action is examined, the decision maker mentally
imagines (mentally simulates) how the action will achieve the goal. If he decides that
the action will work, he accepts it as his decision and implements it. If, during his
mental simulation, he decides th at the action will work with modification, he men
tally makes the modification, mentally simulates the modified action, and continues
until the action is either accepted or rejected. If rejected, the decision maker must
then choose another action and repeat this process. Since he is examining each action
one by one rather than comparing actions against each other, he may not achieve an
optimal decision, but will select one th a t he believes provides at least a satisfactory
solution.
There are three key decision maker attributes th at influence the use of the RPD
model. The first is experience or expertise with the decision situation. The more
experienced or familiar a decision maker is with the problem domain, the more likely
he is to employ RPD to arrive at a decision [19, 21, 22]. An Army general C JTF
is likely to have significant experience with land warfare and thus would have the
background to formulate a decision in this domain using RPD. Conversely, a Navy
admiral C JTF would feel less comfortable making a decision about land warfare
without first gathering as much background information as feasible before deciding
on a certain COA since he does not have the career experience in this area. He would
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be more likely to compare COAs using an analytical method to arrive at a decision
than to recognize an appropriate COA based on his past experience. Or he would
at least use the analytical method to gain insight into the problem before employing
RPD to arrive at a decision [19].
The second key attribute is situational awareness (SA). In simple terms, SA is
the decision maker’s understanding of the context of the decision situation. A more
complete definition was given by Endsley [28] as “. .. the perception of the elements
in the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their
meaning and the projection of their status in the near future.” SA is directly coupled
with experience9 in th at experienced decision makers expend more effort trying to
understand the situation (gain SA) so th at they can m atch the decision situation to
previous experience as closely as possible [29]. Because they broader experience, the
ability to pattern match between previous situations and the current situation sets
experienced decision makers apart from novices [30].
Endsley [28] proposed a model of SA consisting of three levels:
• Level 1 SA—Perception of the elements in the environment.
• Level 2 SA—Comprehension of the current situation.
• Level 3 SA—Projection of future status.
These three levels bear further explanation. Level 1 is the first step in achieving
SA. A decision maker must become aware of the status, attributes, and dynamics
of key elements making up the decision situation. Once he understands these key
elements, the decision maker is then able to synthesize disjoint elements into a holistic
picture and relate it to his goals. This process constitutes Level 2. Level 3 SA occurs
when a decision maker is able to take the current holistic picture and project the
future actions of the elements based on the dynamics among the elements. Novice
9Experience includes both direct personal experience and indirect vicarious experience.
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decision makers may be able to identify the key elements of a situation but it is
usually only the experienced decision maker th at can relate them to one another and
to project a future outcome.
Endsley’s view of SA is consistent with RPD. Level 1 SA directly relates to the
first step in RPD, experiencing the situation in a changing context. It is through
this experiencing of the situation th at the decision maker begins to understand its
context and its relation to past experiences. Level 2 SA is represented in RPD as
the moment recognition occurs, i.e., the decision maker recognizes the situation and
he becomes aware of the four byproducts of recognition mentioned earlier. Level 3
SA relates directly to R P D ’s expectancies and how the decision maker projects the
situation will play out over the span of its relevancy.
SA can also be thought of as a bridge between perception and cognition [31].
Once a decision maker gains SA via the above three levels, he must translate it into
reasoning, planning, and decision making (cognition), which reflect the action parts
of the RPD model of Figure 3.
The recognition byproduct, cues, is an im portant part of experience and SA [30].
Cues are derived from both a decision maker’s past experience and the context of the
current decision situation gained through SA. Cues are the im portant factors of the
current decision on which the decision maker is focusing. Cues act as a filter on the
potentially vast amounts of d ata th at may be reaching the decision maker and allow
him to focus on only information th at is critical to the decision. The use of cues
by decision makers was noted many years earlier by Brunswick in his lens model of
decision making [32] and extended by Brehmer and Hagafors in their study of staff
decision-making [33] and Hollenbeck et al. in their study of team decision-making
[34].
The third decision maker attribute, mental simulation, plays a significant role
in RPD. Decision makers use mental simulation to help diagnose a situation. They
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imagine different aspects of a problem and form an explanation or mental picture of
the problem. It also helps them decide whether the situation is familiar or not (pattern
matching against previous experience) by mentally examining various aspects of the
situation’s elements. The end result of this portion of mental simulation is SA over
the problem.
Mental simulation also helps generate and evaluate expectancies. It allows the
decision maker to mentally examine events as they might occur so as to understand
the end result of a particular option.

He can also determine the accuracy of his

mental simulation by checking how well his expectancies were satisfied. The fewer
the number of expectancies satisfied, the less confident a decision maker would be
about his mental simulation and diagnosis.
Once a decision maker has diagnosed the problem and generated expectancies,
he uses mental simulation to sequentially evaluate solution options. Each option is
mentally played out until one is found th a t satisfies the situation.
In summary, the RPD model is a naturalistic decision making model th a t explains
how a decision maker uses his past experience and mental simulation to recognize a
situation, develop expectancies about the situation, sequentially analyze COAs, and
choose one th a t provides a satisfactory outcome.

2.2

M ilitary decision m aking

The types of decisions th at a C JT F makes can be summed up in two general cate
gories. The first are decisions for selecting and executing military actions to achieve
joint force objectives. The second are decisions regarding the allocation of resources
to those actions [4], To aid him in making these decisions, the Department of De
fense (DoD) has adopted a set of steps known as the estimate process to help guide
military commanders in COA analysis and selection [4], The estimate process steps
are as follows:
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• Determination of the mission. This includes mission analysis where the National
Command A uthority’s (NCA) guidance and objectives are taken into account
and the generation of a mission statem ent th at describes the essential tasks to
be accomplished and the purpose to be achieved.
• Situational assessment and COA generation. COAs should outline an ordered
set of operational tasks to be accomplished, the forces required, a logistics
concept, a deployment concept, an estimate of time to achieve the objectives,
and a concept for reserve contingencies.
• Analysis of opposing COAs. Determine the possible impact of enemy COAs on
the success of each friendly COA. Develop a list of advantages and disadvantages
for each friendly COA.
• Comparison of friendly COAs. Evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of
each. Refine COAs as necessary.
• Decision. The C JT F chooses the best COA and implements it.
The estimate process provides a framework upon which more detailed planning
steps are built. Specifically, the Deliberate Planning process and the Crisis Action
Planning (CAP) process follow the outline of the estimate process. They are the
formal processes the C JT F uses in his planning [35].
Deliberate planning is, as its name implies, a methodical procedure to assess
and prepare for probable warfare contingencies th at a C JTF faces in his theater of
responsibility. Steps include initiation, concept development, plan development, plan
review, and supporting plans. This type of planning takes place over several months
and results in a general operational plan for the relevant contingencies.
CAP, on the other hand, spans a much shorter time, usually over hours or days,
and addresses a specific problem th at requires a military solution almost immedi-
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Figure 4. The decision-making cycle in the OODA model [36].
ately. It has 6 steps th at include: situation development, crisis assessment, COA
development, COA selection, execution planning, and execution.
While deliberate planning involves the C JTF, most of the operational decisions
th at he encounters occur under the CAP process. CAP requires the CJTF and his
staff to gain SA on the mission, to develop and analyze COAs, and for the commander
to decide on the best COA to follow. This process is the essence of joint operational
planning. It provides the necessary information for a C JT F to make operational
decisions.
Rather than CAP being a finite process with a specific beginning and end, one can
think of it as a continuous process following the pattern of observe, orient, decide, act
or “OODA loop.” The OODA loop is depicted in Figure 4. The OODA model was
introduced in 1987 [37] as a way to describe military decision-making and has been
accepted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) as a valid representation of the military
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decision process [36].
The C JT F observes the results of his decision and these results are fed back into
the loop for analysis, more decisions, and further actions. The cycle continues until
the crisis is resolved.
Figure 5 represents a more detailed depiction of the OODA model. There are
several parallels between it and the RPD model. They both begin with observing the
situation at hand. Once observed, both models have the decision maker going through
an orient phase where he tries to relate the situation to past experiences. The RPD
model goes one step further at this point. It includes mental simulation; a process
th a t an experienced decision maker uses to refine a COA th at he intuitively feels is
the best. The OODA model is not clear on how a decision maker examines COAs,
only th at an analysis is done (a weakness in thoroughly explaining the human decision
process). Also, the OODA model does not limit the decision maker to examining one
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COA only, which is what most experienced decision makers do [19]. Following this
step, both models indicate a decision is made and action is taken to implement that
decision.
Both models rely heavily on feedback. In the OODA model, a decision maker
uses feedback from his decision and resulting action to modify experience and thus
influence future decisions. Decision maker actions in the RPD model are much the
same, using feedback to refine an intuitive COA choice, observing the results of a
decision, and using those results as input to future decisions.
While the estimate process, deliberate planning, and CAP describe methods a
military decision maker should follow to make decisions, they do not account for
the psychological aspects of how an expert, in this case a CJTF, cognitively makes
decisions. They follow along the path of how decisions are described in classical
decision theory. The RPD model, on the other hand, was derived from observation of
expert decision makers [19] and depicts the cognitive processes they use to arrive at
decisions. This model has been shown to be valid in the military domain [21, 23, 39,
40, 41] where military decision makers employed RPD in at least 60% of the decision
situations presented to them. This fact is not surprising since most CAP decisions
are made under time pressure by experienced decision makers in dynamic situations
with often ill-defined goals.
As an illustration, Kaempf et al.

[40] observed how naval officers aboard an

AEGIS cruiser made decisions in the complex, time-pressured environment of the
ship’s Combat Information Center. They found th at the officers employed RPD in
about 95% of their decision situations.
This section has described the doctrine guiding joint service military decision
making. As shown, a structured process of COA development and analysis officially
characterize it. However, generating multiple COAs for selection is not the method
employed by most experienced military commanders when arriving at a decision.
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They may use the COAs to gain insight into the problem at hand. But, when it
comes to making a decision, a C JTF will rely on his assessment of the situation, his
past experiences th a t have made him a military expert, and his ability to intuitive
ly recognize a satisfactory COA th at will ultimately lead him to a decision. This
decision-making procedure is captured in the RPD model.

2.3

C om putational techniques for im p lem en tin g th e C JT F decision pro
cess
“The modeling of cognition and action by individuals and groups is quite
possibly the most difficult task humans have yet undertaken [2], ”
It is one thing to develop a conceptual or mathematical model of how experienced

individuals make decisions. It is quite another to implement th a t model on a comput
er through a set of algorithms. In essence, one must attem pt to emulate the human
brain’s intricate processes of gathering, storing, and assessing information, setting
goals, developing expectancies, performing mental simulation, and arriving at a deci
sion. This section will review the techniques th at have been developed and applied to
implement computational models of human decision-making. It will compare them
to the human decision processes described in RPD to determine how well they model
decision-making. It will look at past methods used to implement a C JT F decision
process and it will also look at ways in which others have attem pted to implement
the RPD model.

2.3.1

F in ite sta te m achines and M arkov Chains

Finite state machines (FSMs) are computational models th a t can be used to simulate
human decision-making.10 They consist of a set of states linked together by transition
10In this context, FSMs are a specific implementation of the more generalized system called finite
state automata (FSA). FSAs are studied in the context of formal computing systems.
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functions. Each state represents a condition of a FSM ’s environment. States can
have associated with them one or more actions to be accomplished once th at state
is reached. The transition functions govern what state is visited next based on the
occurrence of a particular event within the previous state [42].
In the context of decision models, finite state machines can be thought of as
a means of abstracting a decision into a set of states with each state representing
one element leading to a decision. Figure 6 depicts a simple FSM where the circles
represent the states and the arrows connecting the circles represent the events that
cause a transition from one state to another. In this example, the FSM represents a
C JT F ’s decision on when to order an attack. Planning occurs first. Once the planning
event is complete, forces are assigned. If the forces are ready, then they are ordered
to attack. If not properly trained, they transition to a training state until they are
trained and then they are ordered to attack. This simple example illustrates the
concept of how a FSM is used to model a set of elements leading up to the decision
to attack.
A Markov chain is an adaptation of a FSM where the transitions among states are
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probabilistic in nature. Instead of transitioning from one specific state to another in a
deterministic manner, variability is added through a stochastic method of determining
the next state.
M odular Semi-Automated Forces (ModSAF) is one military simulation th at uses
FSMs to simulate human behavior and decision-making [2, 43]. ModSAF’s design is
centered on the concept of tasks. In general, one can break complex military oper
ations up into a series of individual or group tasks. These tasks represent behaviors
and decisions of the simulated forces. Each task within ModSAF is implemented
using a FSM. The actions necessary to accomplish the task correspond to the states
within the FSM.
To date, no researchers have produced a model of the human decision process
using FSMs. One disadvantage that hampers using FSMs to simulate complex human
decisions is th a t the number of states can grow exponentially with every new event
th at is considered. This may hamper FSM ’s ability to scale to a size where realistic
behavior modeling is possible [44].

2.3.2

R ule-based M odels (E xp ert S ystem s)

Rule-based models replicate intelligent behavior by executing a base of knowledge
containing If-Then logical constructs. These rules represent the sum total of con
ditions and actions to which the model can respond. Expert systems are the most
common form of a rule-based model. Figure 7 depicts a typical expert system struc
ture. The heart of the system is the knowledge base. The If-Then rules reside there.
The inference engine is software th at searches the knowledge base and locates the
appropriate rules to follow for the decision at hand based on the data th at is input to
the model. It also provides a means of tracing the logic so th at one can see exactly
how the system arrived at the decision.
One of the difficulties in using a rule-based system to model human decision-
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making is in the ability to generate the knowledge base. It is difficult to get human
experts to express their expertise in a series of If- Then rules. Once the rules are
extracted, it is likely th a t they will be incomplete and inconsistent [45].
Another difficulty is the inflexibility of the system to adapt to a changing context.
If the model encounters a decision situation th a t does not exactly match what has
been captured by the If-Then rules, no rule will “fire” i.e. be chosen. This may lead
to no decision or a default decision th at is inappropriate for the situation [2].
SOAR is a rule-based model th at attem pts to overcome a rule-based system’s
inability to account for a changing situation by adding a learning capability [46].
SOAR is goal-oriented much like human decision makers. When presented with a
decision situation, SOAR identifies a goal and searches through its knowledge base
of If-Then rules for a set of rules to achieve th at goal. If it is unable to find a
sequence of existing rules to achieve th at goal, it will set up subgoals th a t generate
actions th a t can be executed to see if the ultim ate goal can be reached. In this
manner, SOAR overcomes the limitation of having all its knowledge captured before
the start of the decision process. The subgoal logic th at leads to achieving the final
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goal is added to the knowledge base as another set of If-Then rules, thus achieving
a learning capability. The technique used to combine existing rules into new ones is
called chunking.
SOAR has the ability to model a type of erroneous human decision-making. When
a decision maker misperceives the decision environment, it often leads him to make
the correct decision about the wrong problem. T hat is, if his SA of the situation is
not consistent with reality, he may make a decision th at is correct for the perceived
situation but incorrect for the real situation. This type of error has been termed
sensation error [47].
To recognize the decision situation, SOAR has a module th at attem pts to perceive
and assess its environment [2]. It then uses this perceived state as the starting point
for its decision search. A misperceived state could propagate through the model, thus
providing a realistic representation of sensation error.
SOAR has been used in many instances to implement decision-making in military
simulations. One example is TacAir-SOAR, which uses the SOAR decision-making
scheme to model tactical military pilot decisions in various combat situations [48].

2.3.3

Case based reasoning

Case based reasoning (CBR) is a technique in which knowledge is represented as
a compilation of individual cases. One can think of this library as a storehouse of
solutions to previous problems th at can be used as a starting point to solve new
problems.
A case is a set of features containing three major parts: the problem-situation
description th at describes the state of the situation at the time of the case, the
solution that specifies what was decided and in some cases how it was decided, and the
outcome, which contains the state of the situation after the solution was implemented
[49, 50].
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Proper indexing is critical to retrieving the right set of cases to help solve a new
decision problem. In her work on CBR, Kolodner [49] proposed four characteristics
for choosing indexes:
1. Indexes should be predictive.
2. Indexes should be abstract enough to make a case useful in a variety of future
situations.
3. Indexes should be concrete enough to be recognizable in future cases.
4. Predictions th a t can be made should be useful.
To be predictive, an index should contain problem descriptors th at are responsible
for part of the outcome of a case. For example, if having a particular weapon for a
battle helped ensure a victory, then th at weapon should be a predictive index for
success in similar battles.
Achieving the proper level of abstraction is critical to having a useful index. In the
above example, having a particular class of weapon may have been just as successful
in achieving victory thus broadening the number of cases for which it could provide
a satisfactory solution. One must be careful, however, to ensure th at the index is not
too abstract, which could lead to false selection of cases.
It is unlikely th at the closest-matching retrieved case will perfectly match the
target case. At this point, the CBR model applies built-in rules to try and adapt the
retrieved case to its target. These rules are generally domain specific. CBR models
can only tailor themselves to the domain space bounded by these rules.
CBR models have two appealing properties. They contain explicit references to
past decision maker experiences which, as pointed out earlier, is a key aspect of
human decision-making [19]. CBR models can also be used when no valid domain
model exists, i.e., when the only information about a decision domain rests in the
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known cases. Since CBR essentially constructs its domain space dynamically through
its adaption rules, CBR can be used to model complex systems where it is extremely
difficult to generate a valid domain model beforehand.
W hile there haven’t been any implementations of decision models in military sim
ulations using CBR, other domains have employed it to develop decision models. One
example is the construction industry. They used CBR to predict the outcome of con
struction litigation based on features of previous litigation cases. Their prediction
rate reached 83%, which led to better construction planning before the fact, thus
saving significant money for the construction companies [51].
Gilboa and Schmeidler [52] have proposed a new decision theory based on the
CBR technique called Case-Based Decision Theory (CBT). Their theory takes the
concepts of CBR and expands them to cover all aspects of human decision-making.
CBT is similar to RPD in th at it relies on past experience as the basis of decisions
and it argues th at most human decisions are not optimal but most likely satisficing
in nature since a person may not possess the experience to recognize the optimal
decision but can recognize one th at will work.

2.3.4

N eural netw orks

Neural networks (NNs) are algorithmic models of the human brain that are based on
fundamental neuroscience principles of how the brain functions. They are composed
of elements called neurons, which take as input the summed signals from other inter
connected neurons. Once the summed signals reach a specific threshold, the neuron
“fires” and passes its output on to other neurons connected to it. Connection weights
are numbers th a t represent the connection strength between neurons and serve as the
collective memory of the network [53].
The network consists of multiple layers of neurons with one input layer th at accepts
data from the environment, zero or more hidden layers, and an output layer (Figure 8).
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The number and the configuration of these layers determine the processing capability
of the network.
Each neuron receives input values th at are either continuous, falling in the interval
[0,1] or [-1,1], or discrete, taking on values {0,1} or {-1,0,1}. An activation function
associated with each neuron acts on these inputs to produce a single output value for
th at neuron. Typical activation functions are:

f(x)
w

= ——-—
l + e~x
or

fix)

— tanh (x)

Each connection has a numerical weight Wij th at specifies the influence of neuron
Uj on neuron n,. If the weight is positive, there is a positive influence and vice versa.
Each neuron computes its activation value a* by taking as input to its activation
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function the weighted sum of all other neurons that are inputs to it:
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Once a neural network is constructed, it must be trained to make proper deci
sions (provide proper output) for a given set of inputs. This training is typically
accomplished through training data consisting of inputs and their associated outputs. Inputs are supplied to the network. They are propagated through the network
resulting in an output. T hat output is compared to the expected output and an
error is calculated based on their difference. This error is propagated back through
the network via a gradient descent algorithm and the interconnection weights are
adjusted to minimize the error. The input is once again applied. The output is again
compared to the expected output and the minimization cycle continues until the error
is reduced to some acceptable value. This error correction process is known as back
propagation.
Once the network is trained with sufficient data to cover the plausible set of
expected inputs, it should theoretically provide a proper output (decision) when input
d ata is presented to it. A significant advantage to a neural network is its ability to
take incomplete or distorted (noisy) data and still produce an output th at is similar
to one th at would have resulted from perfect input data. In this manner, it can
provide satisfactory decisions based on the uncertain and highly dynamic conditions
th a t exist in a complex warfare scenario [40].
A NN is very good at recognizing underlying patterns in data [53]. Therefore, it
could be a useful tool to implement the recognition part of RPD. However, a signif
icant amount of training d ata would be required to properly prepare the network to
recognize situations over the entire domain of joint warfare. NNs would also have to
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be enhanced with other techniques to allow them to learn new situations. Addition
ally, after the NN recognized the situation, further processing would be required to
determine a satisfactory COA. This step could be accomplished through another NN
or through other logical techniques such as rule-based reasoning discussed earlier, or
by using a fuzzy inference system [40] to be discussed in the next section.
One effort attem pted to implement RPD using a NN approach [54]. Here, the
NN performed the RPD tasks of situational awareness and COA selection. To train
the network, 12 military experts were each shown 12 different scenarios and were
asked to devise plans to achieve the goals of each scenario. The scenario starting
data and the resulting plans generated by the experts were then digitized to form the
training data. Once the network was trained, the researchers input new scenarios to
it and had the military experts analyze the network’s solutions. Results from these
tests showed th a t the NN was a viable tool to implement RPD. However, it had
certain shortcomings. Mental simulation, a key factor in RPD, was not implemented
in this work. Therefore, there was no mechanism to take a marginal solution and
refine it to one th a t was more acceptable. Also, perfect scenario data was used as
an input to the NN. In reality, a military commander would rarely have perfect data
on which to recognize the situation. The NN did not take into account individual
commander personalities and preferences. These factors must be addressed to have a
more accurate and complete model of a commander’s decision-making process.

2.3.5

Fuzzy logic and fuzzy inference system s

Fuzzy logic is a revision to classical set theory. It is based on the thought th at
humans don’t necessarily categorize information in a crisp manner. Rather, they
describe conditions in terms of fuzzy conditions [55]. For example, if you asked a
person how he decides when to turn up the therm ostat on the heater, he most likely
will say, “When I feel cold.” He probably will not say, “Oh, I do it when I think it is
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68°F.” If asked the same question, a second person would give a similar answer but
his idea of what cold is will probably differ from the first person. In this case, cold
is a fuzzy value th at has some degree of membership in a set, unlike in classical set
theory where an object is either in or not in the set. The degree of membership is
based on a defined membership function on the interval [0,1] with zero representing
fully not in the set and one representing fully in the set. A value in between would
specify the degree of membership, e.g. 68°F is 40% cold.
Once fuzzy variables have been designed, one can set up fuzzy inference rules th at
can be used as a logic structure for decision-making. This technique is similar to a
rule-based system except th at different rules may fire based on how a fuzzy variable
value is chosen. The following is an example of a possible fuzzy rule th at may be
modeled for an operational decision by a CJTF:
I f the weather is acceptable and troop strength is high and supplies are
adequate,
then authorize the attack,
else wait to satisfy the conditions.
Because of the fuzziness in the variables(weather, troop strength, supplies), multiple
rules may fire for a given decision. In th at case, a method to combine rule outputs
must be devised so th at the simulation can choose a single action representing the
commander’s decision.
One other concept, defuzzification, must be explained. At times, discrete values
may be required to control some action. While humans understand vague terms such
as “Turn the handle to the right a little,” a computer must have a discrete value to
execute th at action. Defuzzification employs an algorithm to convert a fuzzy value
to a discrete value to be executed by the computer. This algorithm can significantly
affect how actions are carried out and must be chosen carefully to achieve the desired
decision-making realism.
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Clearly, fuzzy inference can be used as an enhancement to a rule-based decision
model to provide more human-like characteristics. It could also be used to help gen
erate a human perception of a decision situation. Instead of dealing with discrete,
digitized data, fuzzy variables could be used to describe the situation (situational
awareness) in terms of how a human perceives it. This perception could then form
the basis of an input to a NN to generate a COA. Robichaud [56] did just th at by ex
tending the NN with fuzzy inference rules in [54] with favorable results. However, his
decision model still did not account for mental simulation or commander personality.
While not a specific implementation of RPD, Vakas et al. [57] used fuzzy rule sets
to implement decision-making in the Commander Model (CM) and the Commander
Behavior Model (CBM) of the Joint Warfare System (JWARS). These rule sets were
used in CM to assess situations, to determine doctrinal reactions to situations, and
to determine the likelihood of achieving an objective in a given situation. The CBM
added four other fuzzy rule sets concerned with commander personality and the rating
of intermediate actions used to achieve a goal. Their decision-making model essential
ly accounts for all parts of RPD with one exception. It considers multiple COAs all
at once and tries to optimize the selected action rather than using mental simulation
on a single COA to achieve a satisfactory set of actions to achieve the stated goal.
Also, all portions of the fuzzy rule sets mentioned above have not been completely
implemented so complete performance results of their model are not available.
Combining fuzzy logic with neural networks shows promise as a decision-modeling
tool. It uses the strengths of these two concepts to form a nemo-fuzzy system for
decision-making. George and Cardullo [58] used this technique to model the decisions
pilots made to position their aircraft to track other aircraft. NNs were used to learn
the responses pilots made to various tracking situations. The NN then categorized
these responses into seven fuzzy responses th at were used to decide how the control
model would respond. They achieved results comparable to the human decision re
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sponses except when only small error adjustments needed to be made. They surmised
th at using smaller fuzzy sets near the zero point as well as more fuzzy inference rules
would correct the problem.

2.3.6

M u lti-a g e n t s y ste m sim u la tio n
I ’ll call “Society of M ind” this scheme in which each mind is made of
many smaller processes. These we ’11 call agents. Each mental agent by
itself can only do some simple thing that needs no mind or thought at
all. Yet when we join these agents in societies— in certain very special
ways— this leads to true intelligence [59].

The above quote is from Marvin Minsky, a mathematician and computer scientist
who developed a theory about how the human mind actually works. His research lends
credibility to the hypothesis th at human decision-making can be modeled using multi
agent system technology. He theorized th at the human mind is made of many thought
processes or agents. When combined together, these agents form an intelligent being.
Modeling the human decision process using MAS is based on this premise.
To ensure a common understanding of MAS, the following definitions are provided:
A g e n t. An autonomous, computational entity th at perceives its environment through
sensors and acts upon th at environment through effectors to achieve goals.
M u lti-a g e n t s y ste m . A system in which several interacting, intelligent agents pur
sue some set of goals or perform some set of tasks [60].
M A S sim u la tio n . A bottom -up modeling technique th a t uses diverse, multiple agents to im itate selected aspects of the real world system’s active components
[61].
MAS is a relatively new field th a t has its origin in several disciplines, the two most
im portant ones being distributed artificial intelligence (DAI) and artificial life (A-
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Life) [62]. DAI is a sub-field of artificial intelligence (AI) dealing with defining and
constructing multiple intelligent systems th at interact. A-Life can best be described
as “abstracting the underlying principles of the organization of living things and
implementing them in a computer so as to be able to study and test them [63].”
MAS simulations can be used as a bottom-up approach to modeling complex and
ill-defined problems. The appeal of MAS simulations for modeling the human decision
process lies in their ability to leverage the emergent behavior11 of several individual
agents to discover a new path to a solution not previously envisioned by the simulation
designer. This is possible due to the many interactions th at can take place among
multiple agents. The result of these interactions are not explicitly defined at the
start of the simulation but evolve as the agents encounter one another and their
environment. Human decisions are based on past experiences and understanding of
the current decision situation, i.e. they are unique to the person and could be as
numerous as the number of people faced with the decision. A MAS simulation can
enhance the ability to produce a human decision model because it can generate many
unique options th at rival the ones humans are capable of generating. MAS simulations
promote adaptive behavior in a rapidly changing world much the way humans adapt
their decisions based on the context of the situation they are experiencing.
In keeping with Minsky’s concept of many agents acting together to define the
human mind, researchers at Naval Postgraduate School have developed the concept
of a Composite Agent (CA) [64], A CA is composed of a combination of cognitive
Symbolic Constructor Agents (SCA) and Reactive Agents (RA) th a t work together to
define a complex agent entity. A CA can be programmed to simulate an individual
decision maker with specific goals to achieve, actions to take, and a personality to
influence decisions.
A description of the CA architecture is in order. As depicted in Figure 9, a CA
11One can think of emergent behavior as a complex pattern of actions that are generated at run
time from the simple behaviors possessed by the individual agents.
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F ig u re 9. Composite Agent [64],
has one or more SCAs and RAs. SCAs perform the role of sensing and interpreting
the CA’s environment. They gather sensory input from the CA’s environment, Eouter,
and build a symbolic inner environment, E inner, th at represents how the CA perceives
its surroundings much the same way humans use their senses to experience their
surroundings and form a perception of them. The SCAs also act as a filter so as
not to overload the CA in a sensory-rich environment. E inner can be controlled to
represent only the information normally available to a decision maker through his
information gathering process. It is most likely not a one-for-one mapping of Eouter
to Einner. This realistically portrays how decisions are made based on the perceived
environment. This internalization can lead, as in reality, to incorrect decisions when
the perceived situation does not closely match the actual situation. This perceived
environment is a key attribute to have in a model of human decision-making [47].
RAs use E inner generated by the SCAs to select actions for the CA to perform.
CAs include multiple RAs, each one responsible for a particular CA behavior. RAs
have one or more goals th a t drive the selection of a particular action. W ith multiple
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RAs, CAs can have many goals vying for attention just as human decision makers
must contend with competing goals. These goals constantly shift in priority based on
the dynamic nature of the perceived situation. The CA contains a variable goal man
agement process contained within the RAs th at closely mimics a hum an’s flexibility
and adaptability in dealing with changing situations [64]. This structure allows a CA
to rapidly adjust its selected COA based upon how quickly a given decision situation
is changing.
Goals consist of four components: state, measurement method, weight, and actions
for achieving the goal. The goal’s state indicates if it is active, dormant, or in some
other domain-specific state. The measurement method uses the sensory input from
the SCAs to calculate the strength of a goal and how well it is being satisfied. This
is the mechanism th at allows the agent to prioritize its goals and adjust them to the
situational context. Goal weight is a measure of priority and importance. It can
be updated based on agent experience to replicate reinforced learning. The action
set are those steps the agent must accomplish to attain the goal. CA goals directly
relate to RPD goals. In the RPD model, a decision maker has specific goals th a t are
byproducts of the recognition process. The goals are what he is trying to achieve and
govern the actions he selects to achieve them. CAs perform the same way. Goals
guide the CA by influencing its choice of actions to achieve the desired end state.
The action steps necessary to achieve a goal must be related to the context of the
situation th at the agent is experiencing. To accomplish this, a data structure called
tickets was developed. It encodes the procedural knowledge necessary to accomplish
the actions associated with each goal. It ensures th at these procedures have some
doctrinal structure to prevent agents from adapting so radically th at they take actions
not consistent with plausible military operations.
For any given goal, there may be several COAs to follow to achieve it. Selecting
the most appropriate COA to fit the particular context of the situation is the job
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of devices called connectors. As Hiles et al. state [64]: “Connectors are a way to
associate impressions, ideas, and actions with a given context and achieve a logical
sequence of behavior.” Their main function is to ensure the most appropriate action
is chosen to satisfy a goal given the specific context of the decision situation. In RPD,
this replicates how an experienced decision maker distinguishes among subtle nuances
of similar situations and “knows” which set of actions to take th at are appropriate to
those subtle differences.
CAs also have a built in learning process. By associating a weight value with
actions used to achieve a goal, they can ignore actions th at do not further their goals
and more frequently employ those actions th at do. This simple reactive learning
process is similar to a human using his experience about what works and what does
not work in a situation to know what to do when a similar problem presents itself.
The CA’s design closely matches components of the RPD model and appears to be
a viable tool with which to implement RPD. The following paragraphs compare the
previously defined characteristics of the RPD model to those of a CA. The numbers in
parenthesis after the paragraph headings refer to the seven RPD features mentioned
in Section 2.1.3.
A d ap ts to changing situ a tion (1,7). The RPD model is context sensitive. It has
feedback mechanisms th at continually monitor the situation and refine a deci
sion maker’s response based on the changes. CAs do the same by constantly
evaluating the inner environment sensed by the SCAs and shifting their goal
priorities to respond to the perceived situational changes.
B ased on exp erien ces (2). The foundation of RPD is th a t human decisions are
greatly influenced by their direct and vicarious experiences, which provide a
knowledge base for recalling or recognizing past decisions and their contexts. In
a similar manner, CAs contain data structures th at encode individual experi
ences along with representation of the doctrinal procedures th a t help to balance
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an agent’s actions.
A ccou n ts fo r personality (2). Because RPD is based on a decision maker’s per
sonal experience, it incorporates his tolerance for risk, his mental state, and
possibly his physical state. CAs are able, through data structures, to encode
these individual personality traits and have them influence the outcome of a
decision.
Sensory d ata filte re d by cues (2). A realization of relevant cues is a byproduct
of situational recognition in the RPD model.

These queues help focus the

decision maker on the im portant information necessary to monitor the situation.
Similarly, one can program SCAs to focus on specific aspects of the sensed
environment to prevent sensory overload of the RAs.
Satisfies v ice op tim izes decisions (3,4,5,7). Another key tenet of RPD is that
experienced decision makers look for satisfactory vice optimal decisions. They
tend to use the first set of actions th a t adequately solve a problem without
conducting an exhaustive search for better alternatives. CAs act the same way
because their goal management process does not perform a complete search for
an optimal solution, but will choose one based on some base set of criteria.
Em ploys m ental sim u lation (6). RPD regards mental simulation as the process
used by decision makers to modify previous experiences into a COA to meet
the particular requirements of an existing situation. While CAs don’t perform
mental simulation explicitly, they do have data structures th a t allow them to
recall past experience, and through their inherent capability to discover unique
sequences of action, they could be thought of as performing mental simulation.
Further modification of RA behavior would more fully implement this concept.
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2.3.7

O ther R P D im plem entations

The above sections have reviewed the computational techniques th at can be used
to model the human decision process. This section specifically addresses how these
techniques have been used to implement the RPD model.
Researchers from Micro Analysis and Design and Klein Associates have imple
mented parts of RPD using a data structure to encode a decision-maker’s long-term
memory (LTM). LTM holds the person’s experience and is the basis for situation
al recognition in the model [65]. Their approach to simulating LTM is based on
Hintzman’s multiple-trace memory model [66]. As an agent experiences its environ
ment, it leaves behind a trace of the experience. These traces are stored in the LTM
database and represent the sum total of the agent’s experience. As a new situation
is encountered, it is compared with each experience in LTM. A similarity value is
computed and is used to “recognize” a closely related experience and its associated
COA. This modeling approach has been implemented in a test bed environment, and
while not a complete model of the RPD process, it shows promise in forming part of
a computational representation of RPD.
Researchers at NASA Ames Research Center developed M OCOGl [56]. This
simulation implemented RPD using heuristic rules w ritten in the declarative logic
programming language Prolog. While their effort appears to have successfully im
plemented RPD in an algorithmic form, since it was rule-based, it was limited in
its decisions by the explicit rule set programmed into the model. It was employed
in a static environment and therefore not suitable to simulate the complex dynamic
environment of operational level warfare.
Scientists from the University of Melbourne [67] have begun an implementation of
RPD using a form of MAS simulation called a Belief-Desire-Intent (BDI) agent. BDI
agents evolved from the theory of practical reasoning developed by Michael Bratm an
[68]. His theory focuses on how human intentions influence reasoning and action. One
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can describe the BDI model as follows. Belief is analogous to situational awareness
and represents the agent’s interpretation of its environment. Desire can be thought of
as an agent’s goal structure. Finally, intent is the plan currently in place to achieve the
active goal. Similar to this author’s contention, Norling et al. believe BDI agents have
characteristics of the RPD model (goal driven, action oriented). Their current work
revolves around an agent’s ability to recognize subtle differences between situations
so th at the first step in the RPD model (proper diagnosis of the situation) can be
realized. Their model has not yet successfully implemented this process.
As noted above, the BDI implementation of the RPD model is focused on accurate
modeling of situational awareness and goal achievement. It does not include other
aspects of RPD such as personality and mental simulation as will the CA implemen
tation. Additionally, CAs handle the cue and expectancy parts of the RPD model.
These parts of the model are not addressed by BDI.

2.4

Sum m ary o f th e sta te-of-th e-art

This section presented an overview of the relevant theories th at have emerged to de
scribe human decision-making. Until the late 1980’s, human decision characterization
was dominated by classical decision theory, a theory th a t stated humans always made
decisions in a logical manner th a t maximized the decision outcome value. It provided
a means to calculate decision outcomes in terms of probabilities of risk and uncertain
ty. It focused on the decision outcome itself rather than on the context th at described
the decision situation. Utility theory was incorporated to account for tolerances of
individual risk preferences since each person has a unique threshold for accepting a
particular decision outcome.
Classical decision theory came into question when research showed th at humans
do not necessarily make decisions in a logical manner. Few people spend time per
forming decision optimization calculations and many decisions can not be formulated
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in m athem atical terms. Personal biases also influence decisions and tend to drive hu
mans away from the purely optimal choice because of many competing factors. This
led researchers to investigate more thoroughly how humans actually make decisions.
As a result, the theory of Naturalistic Decision Making was developed.
NDM is based on the intuitive steps a person follows in reaching a decision rather
than on a mathematical process for computing optimal outcomes. Decision makers
tend to make decisions under the NDM paradigm rather than using analytical means
when problems are ill-structured; the decision environment is rapidly changing; and
when decisions must be made under time stress and involve high stakes. The more
experience a decision maker has in a particular decision domain, the more likely he is
to employ NDM since his experience provides for a significant intuitive feel of which
COA should be chosen. The RPD model was formulated to instantiate NDM in a
formal manner and represents the decision process of an experienced decision maker.
Since senior military commanders, e.g., CJTFs, are considered expert in the art and
science of warfare, RPD is a valid model for describing their decision process. RPD
has been validated in the military domain.
Several computational methods exist for implementing the human decision pro
cess. Rule-based models have been used in the past for the majority of military
simulation decision modeling. Since it is very difficult to define a set of rules th at ac
count for all decisions th a t s simulated military commander must make, models based
on this approach tended to be too predictable and inflexible. Neural networks, fuzzy
logic, and case based reasoning are techniques th at have been employed to increase
the robustness of military simulation decision models and have succeeded in varying
degrees.
Multi-agent system simulation has just begun to be used to implement decision
making in the military simulation domain. The concept of a composite agent was
derived from MAS and has characteristics th at closely m atch the RPD model. It
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appears to be a viable computational model with which to implement RPD.
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3

RESEARCH PROJECT

From review of the background material in Section 2, RPD was chosen as the most
appropriate cognitive model to represent a senior military commander’s decision pro
cess. MAS simulation, including composite agents, was chosen to implement RPD
because of the close match between MAS simulation characteristics and the concepts
of RPD. RPD Agent is the MAS simulation th at resulted from this implementation.
This section describes RPDAgent from its design process through its implemen
tation. It also details the validation approach taken to ensure an accurate model. It
concludes with an analysis of the research data and the associated statistical results.
3.1

R P D A g en t design and im p lem en tation

RPDAgent design was focused on implementing the various portions of RPD in a
computational form. These parts included modeling human experience, capturing
the recognition process including its byproducts of goals, cues, expectancies, and
actions, and implementing the action evaluation and selection process. Model design
started with a formal MAS simulation engineering process to develop the architecture
needed to describe the RPD model. This architecture formed the basis for writing
the software code necessary to implement the cognitive behavior described by RPD.
A decision scenario was also developed to provide for a limited scope experience base
on which to test the model.

3.1.1

R P D A g en t A rch itectu re D esign

When designing a complex software system, it is im portant to follow a formal design
process to ensure th a t system design goals are met. This is especially true when
designing MAS simulations with their complex interactions and their numerous agent
states. One such process, and the one used for RPDAgent, is th at of DeLoach [69,
70]. DeLoach’s MAS engineering approach consists of a project analysis phase and a
project design phase. The analysis phase includes: identifying system goals, applying
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use cases, and refining roles. The design phase maps the analysis products to agents by
creating agent classes, constructing agent communication, assembling agent classes,
and defining system deployment.
The first step under the analysis phase, capturing goals, takes the system speci
fication (RPD model) and maps it into a set of goals, which the MAS must achieve.
This step is crucial to ensuring th at the overall system design goals are met. For
RPDAgent, system goals consisted of:
• Controlling system initialization and execution.
• Recognizing the decision situation facing the model.
• Constructing an internal representation of an external environment.
• Constructing a representation of the current decision and coordinating a deci
sion action.
• Evaluating potential decisions against agent goals.
Once system goals were identified, use cases12 were developed. They define how
the system should behave in a given situation and help define the role agents must
play to produce the desired model performance13. RPDAgent’s use cases consisted
of:
• Producing a decision from a given set of inputs.
• Reevaluating a decision when the initial inputs change or when new inputs are
presented.
Use cases also represent a sequence of events between roles. This event representation
defines the minimum set of communications th a t must take place among the agents.
12Use cases are a sequence of events that define desired system behavior.
13A role is an abstraction of an entity’s function. The concept of a role is similar to that of an
actor in a play.
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Table 3. Roles and associated agent classes
A gent Class
R ole
System management
MainAgent
Recognition functions
RecognitionAgent
Internalization of Environment SymbolicConstructorAgent
Decision coordination
DecisionAgent
Decision evaluation
ReactiveAgent
Roles for RPDAgent include: system management, recognition functions, inter
nalization of the external environment in a way th at mimics human internalization,
decision coordination, and decision evaluation.
Role refinement consisted of developing tasks th at defined role behavior. These
tasks represent high level agent behavior th at will be transformed into detailed agent
functionality once specific agents are defined. Tasks for RPDAgent included:
• Providing an interface with the RPDAgent program.
• Initializing RPDAgent experience.
• Performing situation recognition and matching it to previous experience.
• Generating a sequence of preferred actions.
• Evaluating an action against agent goals.
• Selecting a satisfactory decision.
• Handling interagent communication.
W ith the project analysis phase complete, the above results were used as the basis
for the design phase. Agent classes were defined based on the identified roles with
one agent class representing each specified role. Table 3 shows the relationship of the
identified roles to the agent classes.
Since an agent is an autonomous entity, it must have a means of communicating
and interacting with other agents and its environment. These functions are handled
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via an agent communication mechanism, which was defined next. Message type and
content were developed to allow the agents to carry out their assigned tasks in support
of the use cases th a t they were required to execute.
Agent assembly and system deployment were combined into one step. Here, agent
methods and variables were developed to give each agent its required functionality.
This functionality will be explained in detail below. RPDAgent was implemented
using the Java programming language [71] because of its object oriented nature and
its powerful interface and data base capabilities.
In addition to the main agent classes, several other software classes were developed
to help with various tasks th at the agents must perform and to act as custom data
structures for RPDAgent’s long term memory (experience) and internalization of
its environment. The functionality of these classes will be included in the detailed
RPDAgent description to follow.

3.1.2

R P D A g en t E xperience R ep resen tation

To understand RPDAgent’s architecture, one must first comprehend how RPDAgent
represents human experience. This section will provide a detailed discussion on the
methodology used to represent experience.
RPDAgent’s experience structure consists of a set of frames and a negotiation
function. The model’s experience in a specific situation is defined by the following
structure:

E =(F,n)

(4)

where E is a single situation experience with E € E* the total model experience, F
is a frame, and

77

is a negotiation function.

The first of these variables is a data structure called a frame, which is a framework
for representing knowledge.

Minsky [72], who conceptualized the idea of frames,

describes them as follows.
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“W hen one encounters a new situation (or makes a substantial change in
one’s view of the present problem), one selects from memory a structure
called a frame. This is a remembered framework to be adapted to fit
reality by changing details as necessary. A frame is a data structure for
representing a stereotyped situation... Attached to each frame are several
kinds of information. Some of this information is about how to use the
frame. Some is about what one can expect to happen next. Some is about
w hat to do if these expectations are not confirmed.”
Frames embody many RPD concepts. A frame is a convenient structure for capturing
discrete pieces of information about a situation. For this architecture, each frame
will hold the set of all cues, goals, and actions associated with a decision experience.
Formally:
F — (SN , C*, G*, A*)

(5)

where S N is the situation name, C* is the set of all cues for an experience and C is a
single cue with C € C*, G* is the set of all goals for an experience and G is a single
goal with G 6 G*, and A* is the set of all actions for an experience and A is a single
action with A £ A*.
Frames are indexed by their situation name. These indices represent the sum
total of all experiences contained within RPDAgent. W hen RPDAgent is started,
the experience database situation indices are loaded into computer memory for easy
lookup. The actual frame data is not loaded until its associated situation is matched
with the situation currently being experienced. The following describes each element
th at makes up a frame.
A cue is a d ata structure represented by an object class. Cues are defined as
follows:
C = (C N , C V *, C F *, E *,rn, cw)
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where C N is the cue name, CV* is the set of cue values for each action A, CF* is
the set of cue fuzzy values for each action A, E* is the set of environmental variable
values associated with each cue, rn is a saved random number, and cw is the cue
weighting factor.
CV* is a set of integer values. Each cv of CV* represents a cue value derived from
the set of associated environmental variable values E*, corresponding to a specified
action A. Since this model architecture is focused around decisions made by opera
tional m ilitary commanders, the cues represent higher level abstractions of data th at
a senior commander would use rather than lower level environmental variables th at
one can physically measure. Two or more environmental variables that embody a cue
are aggregated to form the cue value. For example, in deciding the location for an
amphibious landing, a military commander may consider landing zone hydrography
as a cue. The commander would want to know if the hydrography of each potential
landing zone (each landing zone corresponds to a potential action or decision) satis
factorily supports the amphibious landing. Making up the evaluation of hydrography
may be many environmental factors such as water depth, tides, and currents. Howev
er, a commander would tend to aggregate and internalize these lower level variables
into the higher level abstraction of hydrography. The model architecture takes this
aspect into account by providing a function th at calculates cue values from their as
sociated environmental variable values for a given action. This function is defined
as:
n

i=1

(7)

where eitj is the ith environmental variable value associated with the j t h cue value
cvj, ajj is a cue value, cvj G CV*, and n is the number of environmental variables
associated with the cue. Environmental variable values are integers th a t represent
qualitative descriptions of these variables. For RPDAgent, the minimum value for cvj
is zero if all environmental variable values are zero. This situation could occur if all
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e y were unfavorable. Its max value is £ ”=1(m axey) ^

associated environmental

variable values are at their maximum value, i.e., if all were favorable.
Once the appropriate environmental variable values have been mapped to their
respective cues, the discrete cue values generated from the environmental variables
must be converted to a value more representative of how humans perceive cues. Hu
mans tend to think of physical parameters in terms of imprecise values rather than
discrete numbers. When asked to comment on the tem perature, a person will most
likely say th at it is cold or warm or hot rather than give a discrete tem perature such
as 78.4 degrees F. This human representation of physical values is captured in a form
of mathematics called fuzzy logic. Fuzzy logic provides a means of determining the
degree of membership a discrete value has to a fuzzy set th a t represents the human
interpretation of the physical value. See Section 2.3.5 for a further discussion of fuzzy
logic. RPDAgent places cue values in one of three fuzzy categories (fuzzy sets): unsat,
marginal, or sat, based on how past experience interpreted the influence of this cue on
the situation. Most military personnel tend to evaluate conditions in this three part
manner [5, 73] where unsat is military shorthand for unsatisfactory and sat represents
satisfactory. The function, cuefuzzyvalue, maps cue values to fuzzy interpretations of
the cues.
cu efu zzyva lu e : CV* —■» CF*

(8)

The cuefuzzyvalue function plays an essential role in quantifying the model’s expe
rience. The shape of the fuzzy sets will determine how the model interprets a specific
cue. For example, the model could evaluate the hydrography cue for a given action
as either unsat, marginal, or sat. This evaluation will depend on the specific fuzzy
sets th at are picked to represent the cue categories. The specific fuzzy sets are picked
based on how a decision maker intuitively views the value of this cue. The intuitive
view is based on his past experience.
For RPDAgent, triangular fuzzy sets were used to represent the fuzzy values as-
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T a b le 4. Hydrography cue structure
E n v iro n m e n ta l v ariab les
C ue
Hydrography Reef

W ater Depth

Anchorage
Tides

Currents

D e s c rip tio n
none
partial
full
shallow
moderate
deep
none
yes
small
moderate
large
light
moderate
severe

V alue
2
1
0
2
1
0
0
2
2
1
0
2
1
0

sociated with each cue. Triangles capture a maximum fuzzy set value corresponding
to a hum an’s ideal value for the fuzzy parameter and the tailing off of that value
as one moves further away from it on an absolute scale. RPDAgent’s cuefuzzyvalue
algorithm, used to calculate fuzzy values from triangular fuzzy sets, was adapted from
Rao and Rao [74].
The following example illustrates how RPDAgent calculates cv and its correspond
ing fuzzy value (c f ). It is based on the hydrography cue of the amphibious landing
location decision mentioned earlier. Table 4 depicts one possible structure of the
hydrography cue. Hydrography has five environmental variables associated with it.
Each environmental variable has two or three descriptive values and corresponding
numeric values (E *). The descriptive values represent how the decision maker per
ceives these environmental variables based on past experience. The numeric values
are assigned to facilitate computation of cv.
When presented with a decision situation involving an amphibious landing loca
tion, some or all of the environmental variable values will be available. RPDAgent
will then compute cv for the hydrography cue using Equation 7. In this example, the
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Unsat fuzzy set

m
0.6
Marginal fuzzy set

’Sat fuzzy set

0.4

0

2

5

Cue Value (cv)

10

F igure 10. Hydrography fuzzy sets
hydrography cue will have an integer value between zero and ten depending on the
value of each environmental variable for the given situation. Missing information is
assigned a default value chosen by the user.
RPDAgent then computes the hydrography fuzzy value (cf), which represents
the decision maker’s evaluation of this cue based on his past experience and the
current situation data. This evaluation is performed via the fuzzy sets that describe
the decision maker’s “intuitive assessment” of hydrography from his past experience.
Figure 10 depicts the fuzzy sets associated with hydrography. The vertical axis (m)
represents the percentage probability of membership. Because there is more than
one fuzzy set, there is a finite probability th at the cue fuzzy value (cf) will belong
to more than one set. To calculate the cue fuzzy value for a given cv, one must
compute the percentage probability of membership of th at cv to the fuzzy sets. This is
accomplished through the cuefuzzyvalue function derived from the fuzzifier algorithm
of Rao and Rao [74]. To illustrate this algorithm using Figure 10, suppose cv = 2. At
2, the unsat fuzzy set height is 0.6 and the marginal set height is 0.4. The sum of these
two heights provides a normalized value on which to base the percentage probability
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of membership. The subjective probability of being unsat is therefore 0.6/1.0 and the
subjective probability ofbeing marginal is 0.4/1.0. Arandom

number, rn , is then

generated to make the selection. For this example, any rn < 0.6would produce a c f
of unsat. Any rn > 0.6 would indicate a c f of marginal. The value, rn, is saved for
future reference in case RPDAgent must reevaluate this cue based on new or updated
information. Saving rn ensures th at this cue’s evaluation is consistent across the
current decision context.
The next set th at makes up a frame is G*. Each goal in the set is an object class
data structure th at stores RPDAgent’s goal information for a given experience. This
goal structure is defined as follows:

G = (GN, GV, GF, C*g)

(9)

where G N is goal name, G V is goal value, G F is goal fuzzy value, and C* is the set
of cues th a t influence the goal. The com putation of G V and G F will be discussed
below with the DecisionAgent description.
The final set making up a frame is the set of all actions, A*. Each A E A* is also
an object class d ata structure with the following definition:

A = (A N , A*, AV, A F )

(10)

where A N is the action name, A* is the set of environmental variable values associated
with this action, A V is the computed action value, and A F is the computed action
fuzzy value.
Actions can represent both past decisions for a given type of situation and the
available actions th at may be taken in a constrained decision environment. Associated
with each action is a set of environmental variables th at influence it and provide its
context when given specific values. The action evaluation and selection process of
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RPDAgent will be discussed in the DecisionAgent section below.
The final factor associated with defining experience in RPDAgent is the negotia
tion function, rj. A decision maker may have many goals th at he is trying to achieve.
Some of these goals may conflict with one another. For example, a military comman
der may have goals of achieving the mission and minimizing casualties. These goals
could be in direct conflict. The commander must evaluate a given action and decide
if all goals can be satisfied to some threshold level for which he is willing to accept the
risk. If all goals can be satisfied, the decision is relatively easy. If not, the decision
maker m ust weigh the relative value of each goal and decide if he can compromise on
one or more goals to achieve the overall goal. The negotiation function r] allows the
model to assess competing goals, similar to how a human uses mental simulation to
weigh one goal against another. It does this by mapping goal fuzzy values, GF, to
revised goal fuzzy values, based on RPDAgent’s characterization of a decision maker’s
personality traits. RPDAgent encodes personality through a risk value th at repre
sents a decision maker’s risk tolerance. Risk tolerance is the primary personality trait
influencing a senior military commander’s decisions [5]. The negotiation function is
defined as follows:
9 f l = ViP, g f i )

(n )

where g f i is the revised goal fuzzy value for the ith goal, g fi is the goal fuzzy value
for the ith goal, and p is a real value, 1 < p < 2, th at quantifies risk tolerance with 1.0
being risk averse, 1.5 being risk neutral, and 2.0 being risk tolerant. The negotiation
function algorithm will be examined in the ReactiveAgent material presented below.

3.1.3

R P D A gen t Im p lem en tation

The Concept of MAS simulation discussed in Section 2 will now be extended to pro
vide a formal definition of the RPDAgent architecture. This section describes the
functionality of the various classes th a t make up RPDAgent including the interac-
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RPDAgent

MainAgent

SymbolicConstructor
Agent

RecognitionAgent

DecisionAgent

ReactiveAgent

F ig u re 11. RPDAgent UML class diagram
tions th at must take place between the classes. Figure 11 depicts RPDAgent’s class
structure in the unified modeling language (UML) format [75] and represents the
basic agent classes th at will be discussed.
RPDAgent builds on the composite agent concept of Symbolic Constructor Agents and Reactive Agents working together to model the human cognitive process.
However, a composite agent as defined by Hiles et al. [64] is not sufficient to capture
all the processes necessary to model RPD. Additional agent types were added (Fig
ure 11) to achieve the required role functionality. In addition to the UML definition,
RPDAgent can also be defined in mathem atical terms as:

R P D A g en t — (Arna,A rec0g ,A sca,A da,A ra)

(12)

where A ma is MainAgent, A recog is RecognitionAgent, A sca is SymbolicConstructorAgent, A*da is the set of Decision Agents, and A*a is the set of ReactiveAgents.
The MainAgent class performs the system management and user interface role. It
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is here th a t the user interface is created and model commands are input. However,
MainAgent’s most crucial role is the establishment and population of the experience
database. For RPDAgent, experience data was gathered through a Cognitive Task
Analysis process. This process is discussed in Section 3.1.4. W hen RPD Agent starts,
the experience database is initialized by reading in all situation names ( SN) repre
senting all situational experiences of which RPDAgent is aware. The remaining data
such as cues, actions, and goals are not input until a request for a particular decision
is made. When such a request arrives, only the data pertinent to that situation is
input to RPDAgent’s frame structure. This procedure prevents unneeded data from
being unnecessarily loaded.
W ith initialization of the experience database complete, MainAgent transitions
to a wait state, waiting for a decision to be requested of it through its user interface.
This emulates a C JT F ’s staff approaching a C JTF with a decision request. Once
MainAgent receives a decision request, it informs RecognitionAgent of a pending de
cision through an agent communication protocol. RPDAgent implemented a subset
of the Knowledge Query and Manipulation Language (KQML) [76] as its agent com
munication protocol. Message transmission between agents was accomplished by Java
event handlers [77], with each message handled as an event.
When RecognitionAgent receives a decision request from MainAgent, it performs
a lookup of the requested decision type in the experience data base. This lookup is in
the form of a keyword search on the type of decision requested. If no match is found,
RPDAgent notifies the user th at it does not have the experience necessary to render
this type of decision.
If a match is found, RecognitionAgent reads in to computer memory the experience
data associated with this type of decision. It is here th at the frame data structure is
populated with the basic cues, goals, and actions pertinent to this decision. RecognitionAgent then informs SymbolicConstructorAgent of the decision request.
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Recall from the discussion of composite agents in Section 2.3.6 th at Symbolic
Constructor Agents convert external environmental variables into an internal repre
sentation of the environment. This process represents how a human internalizes his
external environment. SymbolicConstructorAgent accomplishes the same objective
for this model architecture. It is here th at each c f G CF* is calculated as described
in Section 3.1.2. Once these calculations are complete, the elements of CF* represent
the personal internalization of the external decision environment.
After the internal environment is generated, SymbolicConstructor Agent instanti
ates a Decision Agent. One DecisionAgent is instantiated for every unique decision
presented to RPDAgent. Each DecisionAgent is then responsible for coordinating its
respective decision situation.
DecisionAgent performs several tasks. First, it surveys the available actions for
the given situation and ranks those actions from most to least desirable. This process
is analogous to the RPD notion of a human decision maker identifying the most
intuitively desirable action and evaluating it first.
n

(13)
3= 1

Action value is computed by summing all cue values associated with th at action. This
computation is shown in Equation 13 where AVi is the action value for the ith action
and ]T cvj,i is the sum of all cvj associated with the ith action. The action with the
largest AVi is considered the most favorable since it has the most positive cue values.
If two or more actions have the same action value, they are sorted in the order they
were evaluated. Cue values (cv) are used for this computation rather than cue fuzzy
values (cf) because this calculation is meant only as an intuitive indicator of the most
favorable action. Further evaluation must be carried out by RPDAgent before this
action is chosen as the most suitable for the situation.
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Decision Agent’s second task is to instantiate ReactiveAgents. One ReactiveAgent
is instantiated for every goal associated with the current decision situation. Once the
ReactiveAgents are activated, DecisionAgent informs them of the decision situation
and requests th at they evaluate the most favorable action against how well that action
satisfies the goals for which they are responsible.
As noted in Section 2.3.6, Reactive Agents’ role is to act on the symbolic repre
sentation of the environment generated by SC As to select an action consistent with
their assigned goals. In RPDAgent, ReactiveAgents perform the same function. They
evaluate how well their assigned goal can be achieved for the given action under
consideration.
goal f u z z y value : CF* —*■GF*

(14)

This evaluation is performed by the goalfuzzyvalue function, which maps cue fuzzy
values to goal fuzzy values as noted in Equation 14. A goal fuzzy value is an evaluation
of the potential for a specific action to achieve a specific goal. The potential is based
on how well the cues associated with a specific action favor accomplishing the goal.
Each decision situation has a set of goals associated with it th a t RPDAgent must try
to satisfy. RPDAgent will use cues and their associated cue fuzzy values as a measure
of how well a specific proposed action will satisfy the goals of the situation.
Just as with cuefuzzyvalue, goalfuzzyvalue has a direct link to quantifying the
model’s experience. Based on past experience, a decision maker associates specific
cues with the evaluation of one or more goals. One can assess the degree to which
a proposed action will achieve a goal by assessing the qualitative influence of th at
action’s cues on a goal. T hat qualitative influence is described by goal fuzzy sets,
which are derived from experience.
RPDAgent’s goalfuzzyvalue method is described as follows. Recall from Equation
9 th a t each goal, G , has a set of cues, C*, th at influence or govern the achievement
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T a b le 5. Goal evaluation example
G o al
| C ues
Accomplish Mission | Beach Topography
Beach Hydrography
Beach Obstructions
Beach Staging Area
Route to Objective
Goal Value

cf
marginal
sat
sat
marginal
sat

GVj.
1
2
2
1
2
8

of it. This set of cues is used to calculate G V as follows.
n

G V = £ (G V „‘ * cwi)
i=1

(15)

where GV* is the integer value th at represents c f for this cue with GV* = 2 if c f =
sat, GV* — 1 if c f — marginal, and GV* = 0 if c f — unsat, cw^ is its respective cue
weight, and n is the number of cues associated with this goal. The cue weighting
factor is applied here because humans often perceive th a t some cues influence goals
more than others.
Once the goal value is computed, RPDAgent converts it to a fuzzy value represent
ing more closely how a military commander perceives his goal evaluation. Goal fuzzy
values (G F ) are derived from triangular fuzzy sets representing an evaluation of sat,
marginal, or unsat. The computation is similar to th at described for cuefuzzyvalue.
The following example serves to illustrate the goalfuzzyvalue function. It is again
based on the amphibious assault landing location decision. Suppose th at one goal a
C JTF has for this decision is to accomplish the mission. Associated with this goal
are five cues th a t directly influence it. Table 5 lists the goal, its associated cues,
their corresponding cue fuzzy values, and the assigned integer value for the cue fuzzy
variables. For the computation of goal value in this example, all cue weights are
assumed to equal one. G V could range anywhere from zero if all cue fuzzy values
were unsat to X)r=i((max

* cwd if all cue fuzzy values were sat.
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Unsat fuzzy set

m
0.6

Sat fuzzy set

Marginal fuzzy set
0.4

0

Goal Value (GV)

5

8

10

F ig u re 12. Goal: Accomplish Mission fuzzy sets
Once G V is computed, the goalfuzzyvalue function is used to compute GF. The
function goalfuzzyvalue uses the same method to compute its fuzzy value as th at
described earlier for cuefuzzyvalue. As an example, suppose G V — 8. From Figure
12, the height of the marginal fuzzy set is 0.4 and the height of the sat fuzzy set
is 0.6. The subjective probability of membership is 0.4/1.0 for the marginal set and
0.6/1.0 for the sat fuzzy set. A random number is then generated to determine the
specific fuzzy membership result. This process is repeated by each ReactiveAgent for
its respective goal. When ReactiveAgents complete their assigned goal evaluation,
they inform the DecisionAgent of their evaluation of the action under consideration.
Once DecisionAgent receives all of its ReactiveAgents ’ goal assessments, it checks
to see if all goals were fully satisfied.14 If they were, RPDAgent accepts the current
action as its decision and renders it to the user. If all goals were not fully satisfied,
DecisionAgent requests th a t the ReactiveAgents negotiate to see if each is willing to
compromise on its goal evaluation to achieve a satisfactory evaluation for all goals.
14Fully satisfied implies all goal fuzzy values were evaluated as sat.
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Since agents are autonomous entities, they do not take orders from other agents.
Instead, they communicate requests and information among one another.

When

they differ in their goal evaluations, they must have a means of resolving those dif
ferences. Many schemes have been devised including auctions and negotiations for
resolving those differences [76]. Negotiation [78] was chosen as the resolution method
for RPDAgent because it best represents how a human decision maker uses mental
simulation to arrive at a compromise on multiple conflicting goals within his mind
[59].
In the case of RPDAgent, compromise is handled within the ReactiveAgents by a
multiplication factor applied to GV. This multiplication factor is based on a decision
maker’s risk tolerance. For RPDAgent, it is represented as a real value from 1.0 to 2.0
with 1.0 being risk averse, 1.5 being risk neutral, and 2.0 representing risk tolerant.
Section 3.2.1 discusses the method for evaluating a decision maker’s risk tolerance.
Multiplication values from 1.0 to 2.0 were selected to provide reasonable compromise
results based on the chosen goal fuzzy sets.

This computation is represented in

Equation 16:
GVn — GV * p

(16)

where G V n is the compromise goal value and p is the risk factor from Equation
11.

A new G F is then calculated as above, based on G V n. The result is then

fuzzified in the same manner as the original goal value. This process represents the
negotiation function, rj th at was defined in Equation 11. The result is reported back
to DecisionAgent. Multiplying G V by p has the effect of increasing G V by some
percentage. The larger p, the greater the increase. This indicates th at a person with
a higher risk tolerance will compromise to a larger extent on a particular goal up
to some threshold set by the risk factor. W ithin RPDAgent, this calculation has
the possible effect of moving the goal fuzzy value into the next higher fuzzy set, i.e.,
from unsat to marginal or marginal to sat, thus allowing for a more favorable goal
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evaluation by its associated ReactiveAgent.
At this point, if all goals are fully satisfied, DecisionAgent renders a decision based
on the current proposed action. If all goals are not fully satisfied, no compromise could
be reached. This situation is similar to a person having a certain goal threshold below
which he will not go. The proposed action is discarded and the next best action is
selected for evaluation. The goal evaluation process is repeated until a satisfactory
action is found or until no satisfactory action is discovered. In this case, a default
decision, supplied with the current decision situation, is rendered.
W hat was described above is the sequence of events RPDAgent follows to satisfy
its first use case, producing a decision from a given set of inputs. The second use case
is concerned with reevaluating a decision when the initial inputs change or when new
inputs are presented. RPDAgent handles this use case in a similar manner except
th at the decision situation has already been identified and SymbolicConstructor Agent
has already generated RPDAgent’s initial interpretation of the external environment.
W hen reevaluating a decision, RPDAgent starts from this point and recalculates cv
and c f for each cue, reevaluates the available actions to determine if the order of
most to least favorable actions has changed, and then evaluates the actions against
the goals in the same manner as in the first use case.
In addition to the primary agent object classes discussed above, there are ten other
object classes th at support RPD Agent’s functionality. They are shown in Figure 13.
The Agent class is a superclass on which all other agents are based. It provides for
basic agent d ata storage and for abstract methods to handle agent communication
events.
AgentEvent and AgentEventListener supplement the Agent class by defining a
general event structure for agents and by implementing the necessary event listeners
th a t allow the agents to communicate with one another.
The Frames class provides the necessary data structures and methods to define
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Figure 13. Complete RPDAgent UML class diagram
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part of the agent’s experience. It is supplemented by the Action, Cue, and Goal
classes, which populate the Frames’ data structures with their respective information.
The EO uter class is closely aligned with Frames and provides data structures to hold
the various environmental variables th at define RPDAgent’s outer environment.
FuzzySet and FuzzyVariable classes provide the ability to define their respective
data structures and to provide the necessary methods to calculate fuzzy values giv
en the fuzzy set definitions. They form the major input to the cuefuzzyvalue and
goalfuzzyvalue functions th at help complete the mechanism for defining RPDAgent’s
experience.
Of note, RPDAgent executes single decision requests on the order of milliseconds
so model execution speed can support faster than real time simulation requirements.

3.1.4

D ecision scenario design

Per the RPD model, cognitive decision-making relies on a person’s past experience to
recognize and to interpret a decision situation. Once recognition occurs, experience
provides for the cues, goals, actions, and expectancies th at guide the decision maker’s
response to the situation. For RPDAgent to respond in the same manner, it must
have an experience base from which to draw. A decision scenario was devised to
provide a limited scope experience base on which to test the model. This decision
scenario was not meant to represent all decision situations th at a C JT F could possibly
face. Instead, it was developed to allow for testing of the model against an operational
military decision th at a C JTF could likely face. Further research is required to identify
and populate an experience base th a t would allow RPDAgent to make all plausible
decisions facing a CJTF.
Given the above, an amphibious assault was chosen as the decision scenario on
which to test RPDAgent. The amphibious assault scenario provided for a wide variety
of operational decisions th at a C JT F could likely face. It allowed for both qualitative
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and quantitative environmental variables and cues on which to base the decisions.
Having both types of these factors was required to ensure physical characteristics
and mental assessments could be accounted for in the decision process. Aspects of
an amphibious assault included skills from all warfare communities such as land, air,
and sea components. This helped ensure th at RPDAgent could represent military
commanders from all Services since a C JT F is likely to come from any one of them.
To facilitate the scenario design, a cognitive task analysis (CTA) of amphibious
assaults was performed. CTA encompasses formal methods to identify the steps a
person uses to perform both physical and mental tasks [79, 80]. Most importantly,
it attem pts to discover a person’s thought processes while he completes a task. Gott
[81] suggested th a t CTA should be used when faced with gathering knowledge of a
complex task th at goes on in the head of the performer, th a t is not presequenced,
and th a t is dynamic, unstable, and ill-structured. These are all characteristic of the
thought process facing a C JT F when he makes an operational decision.
The CTA consisted of two portions. First, an historical review of amphibious
assaults was conducted. Historical assaults have been well documented and analyzed
[82, 83, 84] and provided the majority of information necessary for the CTA. The
assaults th at were analyzed occurred from World War II through the Persian Gulf
War. As a result of this analysis, two major operational decisions and their associated
cues and goals were identified. These decisions were: assault location (referred to
as location) and assault timing (referred to as timing). To ensure current doctrine,
tactics, techniques, and procedures were accounted for, the CTA results were reviewed
by an amphibious subject m atter expert. The CTA results were found to be consistent
with current amphibious assault planning and decision-making [85].
The second portion of the CTA consisted of questionnaires provided to thirty
military officers with joint operational military experience. The questionnaire was
structured around the knowledge solicitation techniques found in Hoffman, Crandall,
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and Shadbolt [86]. This questionnaire can be found in Appendix B. These officers
were part of the model validation process described in Section 3.2. Their CTA infor
mation was used to confirm the results of the historical review and to add additional
cues th a t were not previously identified.
Location and timing provided two decision points for the scenario. Each decision
point represents a single past experience. These two decision points were influenced
mainly by physical cues. To ensure th at decisions based on mental cues were also
accounted for, two other decision points were added to the decision scenario. The
third point was a decision on whether a change in assault timing was necessary based
on unexpected enemy troop movement (referred to as change). The fourth point oc
curred after the amphibious landing was completed. It required a decision on whether
to continue to fight or to retreat based on unexpectedly heavy enemy opposition and
significant casualties once ashore (referred to as continue). CTA for the third and
fourth decision points came from past history, the CTA questionnaires, and from
the author’s own operational military experience [5]. The fourth decision point was
the only one th a t required extensive modification to the original cues based on the
information provided in the questionnaires. Once the four decision points were de
termined, they were woven into a notional operational military scenario th at a CJTF
could typically face. T hat scenario is contained in Appendix B.
The CTA identified a portion of the d ata necessary to form RPDAgent’s experience
data base. This portion included the cues and goals associated with each decision
point. The experience associated with the location decision consisted of the nine cues
listed in Table 6 and the two goals listed in Table 7. Table 6 also lists each cue’s
associated environmental variables and their possible descriptive values.15 RPDAgent
represented these descriptive values with integers. Generally, the value 2 was used to
encode the most favorable descriptive value, 1 was used to encode the mid descriptive
15The abbreviation CAS in Table 6 stands for Close Air Support
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Table 6. Location cues and associated environmental variables
C ues
E nvironm ental
Variable Values
Variables
Beach Topography
Steepness
shallow, moderate, steep
coarse, fine
Sand type
none, walls, jungle, rocks
Obstacles
Beach Hydrography
none, partial, full
Reefs
Water depth
shallow, moderate, deep
Suitable anchorage
yes, none
Tides
small, moderate, large
Current
small, moderate, severe
W ater obstructions
no, yes
Mines
no,
yes
Barriers
Staging area
adequate, marginal, none
Staging Area
Route to objective
adequate, marginal,
Route to Objective
inadequate
Enemy Defenses
company, battalion, brigade
Level
Equipment
light, moderate, heavy
Enemy experience
novice, experienced,
professional
Experience change
decreasing, constant,
increasing
Enemy CAS
none, yes
Enemy Naval Support none, yes
Enemy Perception
unim portant, important,
Perception
of Location
vital
Quality of Intelligence
excellent, good, poor
Quality
near objective,
Location of Landing Site Location
away from objective
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T a b le 7. Location goals and associated cues
A sso ciated C u es
G oals
Achieve Mission
beach topography, beach hydrography, water obstructions,
staging area, route to objective, location of landing site
Minimize Casualties enemy defenses, enemy perception of location,
quality of intelligence
value if it existed, and 0 represented the least favorable descriptive value relative to
the environmental variable being described.
Two goals were identified by the CTA process for this decision scenario. These
goals were: accomplish mission and minimize own casualties. These goals are typical
of high level goals th a t an operational military commander takes into consideration
when making a decision. In RPDAgent, cues are used to assess how well a specific
proposed action will satisfy a particular goal. Table 7 identifies the cues th at are
associated with the goals for the location decision. Section 3.1.3 explains how these
cues are used in the goal evaluation process.
Actions within RPDAgent can be a combination of previous actions learned from
experience and current actions available to the decision maker.

For the location

decision, the decision scenario of Appendix B identified four possible landing locations
frow which to choose. The location decision was restricted to these four sites because
they were the only sites th at could support an assault. The experience necessary
for action selection was encoded within the fuzzy evaluation of goals as explained
in Section 3.1.3. Table 8 characterizes each landing site identified in the scenario
based on its associated environmental variables. Variable values for each location
were selected at random from among the allowable values. Section 3.1.3 discusses the
encoding of this information within RPDAgent.
CTA for the timing decision identified five cues used by military commanders
for this decision. Table 9 lists these cues along with their associated environmental
variables.
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Table 8. Location actions and associated environmental variable values
A ction s
V ariables
A lpha
Bravo
Charlie
D elta
Steepness
shallow
moderate
moderate
shallow
Sand type
coarse
fine
coarse
fine
rocks
Obstacles
walls
jungle
jungle
none
none
none
full
Reef
W ater depth
shallow
moderate
deep
moderate
Anchorage
none
yes
yes
yes
moderate small
large
large
Tides
severe
moderate
Current
severe
moderate
Mines
yes
no
no
no
W ater barriers
yes
no
no
no
adequate
adequate
Staging area
adequate
adequate
adequate
adequate
Route to objective
inadequate
adequate
Enemy strength
brigade
company
company
company
Enemy equipment heavy
moderate
moderate
moderate
increasing
Enemy change
constant
constant
constant
Enemy experience pro
experienced experienced novice
Experience change constant
constant
increasing
decreasing
Enemy CAS
yes
no
no
no
Enemy naval
none
yes
none
none
Enemy perception im portant im portant
im portant
unim portant
Intel quality
excellent
excellent
poor
good
Location
near
near
near
away
D efau lt decision: No suitable location exists. Do not conduct the assault.
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Table 9. Timing cues and associated environmental variables
C ues
E nvironm ental
Variable Values
V ariables
Troop level
insufficient, marginal, sufficient
Resource
Troop buildup rate
low, moderate, high
Availability
Ship level
insufficient, marginal, sufficient
Ship buildup rate
low, moderate, high
Air support
insufficient, marginal, sufficient
Supply level
insufficient, marginal, sufficient
low, moderate, high
Resupply rate
Weather
Cloud cover
overcast, partly, clear
Cloud cover change
increasing, constant, clearing
Precipitation type
rain, snow, sleet, hail
Precipitation rate
light, moderate, heavy
Precipitation rate change slowing, constant, increasing
Visibility
clear, haze, fog, reduced
Visibility change
clearing, constant, decreasing
Wind level
light, moderate, strong
Wind level change
decreasing, constant, increasing
Wave height
low, moderate, rough
Wave height change
decreasing, constant, increasing
Forecast quality
poor, good, excellent
Troop training
Training
low, moderate, high
Enemy status
Enemy status
unaware, suspicious, alerted
Staff
Recommendation
recommended, not recommended
Recommendation
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Table 10. Timing goals and associated cues
A sso ciated cues
G oals
Achieve mission
resources, weather, troop training,
enemy status, staff recommendation
Minimize casualties troop training, enemy status, staff recommendation
CTA identified the same goals for the timing decision as the ones for the location
decision. The associated cues for these goals are listed in Table 10.
The decision scenario provided for four possible timing choices based on required
coordination with other military forces. These choices were linked to other factors
within the scenario and were the only ones available. Table 11 lists the four timing
choices and their associated environmental variables.
CTA results for the third and fourth decision points are presented below in Tables
12 through 17. For these decision points, the environmental variables th at make up
the cues rely less on physical parameters th at are easily measured or assessed and more
on qualitative parameters th at require human interpretation. Both of these types of
parameters influence decision-making and were included in the model to ensure the
cognitive decision process could be adequately represented within RPDAgent.
The information in these tables forms part of the experience data base necessary
for RPDAgent to mimic the cognitive decision process represented by the RPD model.
Section 3.1.3 discusses other elements needed to represent human experience.

3.2

V alidation m eth od ology

Balci defined modeling and simulation validation as comparing the model to the
real world system to determine if the model matched the real world system to an
acceptable level [87]. To determine if RPDAgent adequately mimicked the decision
process of a CJTF, it also had to undergo validation. This section describes the
validation plan and the tools used to measure the model’s validity.
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T ab le 11. Timing actions and associated environmental variable values
A ctio n s
V ariab les
36 H o u rs 48 H o u rs 72 H o u rs 96 H o u rs
sufficient
sufficient
Troop level
marginal
sufficient
high
low
Troop buildup rate
low
low
sufficient
insufficient
sufficient
Ship level
insufficient
low
low
Ship buildup rate
moderate
moderate
high
Air support
marginal
marginal
marginal
sufficient
insufficient
Supply level
marginal
sufficient
high
high
high
high
Resupply rate
overcast
partly
clear
overcast
Cloud cover
Cloud cover change
clearing
constant
constant
constant
rain
Precipitation type
rain
none
none
moderate
Precipitation rate
heavy
none
none
Precipitation rate change constant
clearing
clearing
constant
clear
clear
reduced
Visibility
fog
constant
Visibility change
constant
constant
constant
strong
light
moderate
moderate
W ind level
increasing increasing
Wind level change
constant
constant
moderate
moderate
Wave height
moderate
low
constant
increasing increasing
Wave height change
constant
Forecast quality
good
poor
poor
excellent
high
Troop training
moderate
moderate
high
suspicious alerted
Enemy status
unaware
unaware
Staff recommendation
no
possible
no
yes
D e fa u lt D ecision: Available timing can not be supported. Assault will not be
conducted.
T ab le 12. Change cues and associated
C u es
E n v iro n m e n ta l
V ariab les
Risk
Enemy force size
Change of plan
Readiness
Reposition
Earlier time
Recommendation Recommendation

environmental variables
V ariab le
V alues
small, moderate, large
low, moderate, high
high, moderate, low
high, moderate, low
recommended, not, possible

T ab le 13. Change goals and associated cues
G oals
A sso c ia te d C u es
risk, readiness, recommendation
Achieve mission
Minimize casualties risk
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Table 14. Change actions
A ction s
C hange L ocation G o On T im e
V ariables
G o Earlier
Enemy force size
small
moderate
moderate
moderate
Change of plan
low
low
Reposition
high
moderate
high
Earlier time
high
high
high
Recommendation recommended possible
possible
D efau lt D ecision: Assault can not be supported under the new conditions.

Table 15. Continue cues and associated environmental variables
E nvironm ental
Variable
C ues
V ariables
V alues
Opposition
Enemy forces
low, medium, high
Casualties
low, medium, high
low, medium, high
W ithdrawal risk
Threat to Terrier
low, medium, high
Probability of success low, medium, high
Recommendation
recommended, possible, not
Force Effectiveness W ithdrawal ability
high, medium, low
Air support
likely, possible, unlikely
Force ration
high, medium, low
Reenforcements
likely, possible, unlikely

Table 16. Continue goals and associated cues
Goals
A sso ciated Cues
Achieve mission
opposition, force effectiveness
Minimize casualties opposition
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Table 17. Continue actions
A c tio n
V ariables
C ontinue on
Enemy forces
high
Casualties
high
W ithdrawal risk
moderate
Threat to Terrier
low
Probability of success medium
Recommendation
not
W ithdrawal ability
high
Air support
likely
high
Force ratio
Reenforcements
likely
D efau lt D ecision: Casualty risk is too great. W ithdraw troops from landing zone.
3.2.1

V alidation plan

There are several methods th at one could employ to validate a model. RPDAgent
was intended to improve upon the decision algorithms in military simulations so th at
they better replicated the decisions a human would make. One way to measure this
improvement would be to compare the decisions made by RPDAgent against existing
model decisions. However, this method posed problems. Incorporating RPDAgent
into an existing model, so that the model decisions with and without RPDAgent could
be compared, was technically problematic and beyond the scope of this research. Also,
how to determine if the model with RPDAgent produced more human-like decisions
is not easily done and could produce inconclusive results.
Instead, RPDAgent decisions would be compared against the decisions made by
real human decision makers. This approach proved to be a better test of model
validity. As noted in Section 1.2, a C JT F makes decisions at the operational level of
warfare. Existing military simulations generally rely on expert role players to make
these decisions and to input them into the model, rather than the model making
them. So, a better test of RPDAgent would be to compare its decisions against the
role players’ decisions.
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A C JT F role player is typically a mid to senior level military officer with joint
operational experience who is taking the place of the C JTF for the purpose of mod
el control and decision-making. For model validation, thirty such role players were
solicited. They represented a population of surrogate CJTFs against which RPDA
gent’s decisions would be compared. The thirty role players ranged in military pay
grade from 0-4 to 0-6. Twenty-one were U.S. military officers from all four Services.
Nine were coalition officers from NATO-affiliated countries. This mixture of role play
ers provided a cross section of military experience th a t represents the population of
military officers from which a C JTF would come.
All role players were volunteers who were solicited from U.S. Joint Forces Com
mand Joint Warfighting Center and Headquarters, Supreme Allied Commander At
lantic. These commands employ military officers with joint and coalition military
experience. In addition, these officers typically participate in Joint Task Force exer
cises as role players. Since these role players are human subjects, they were solicited
under the guidelines of Old Dominion University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB).
IRB approval was obtained prior to obtaining any information from the role players.
Appendix C contains the IRB-approved informed consent document used to solicit
role player data.
To collect the data necessary to compare the role players’ decisions against RPD
Agent, a decision scenario was devised. As noted in Section 3.1.4, this scenario (see
Appendix B) represented four operational decisions th a t a C JT F would likely face
when conducting an amphibious assault in support of a larger campaign. Each role
player was asked to render four decisions, one for each decision point. Their decisions
were only constrained by the scenario. They were also asked to complete the CTA
questionnaire (Appendix B) for each decision to capture any task information not
previously obtained from historical analysis. This provided 120 decisions (30 role
players times 4 decisions) against which to compare RPDAgent.
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In addition to the decision scenario, each role player was asked to complete a per
sonality measurement questionnaire (Appendix D). This questionnaire was based on
Goldberg’s International Personality Item Pool (IPIP) [88], which measures person
ality traits identified by the Five Factor model [89]. This model has been shown to
be an indicator of a person’s risk tolerance [90]. As noted in Section 3.1.3, a person’s
risk tolerance was used as a factor in determining a decision. Risk tolerance is the
personality factor th at most influences a C JT F ’s decision-making [5, 73].
Results of this questionnaire showed th at twenty-nine role players tended towards
risk tolerant. One role player was assessed as risk neutral. However, he made deci
sions th at were similar to those role players who were risk tolerant. Because of this,
RPDAgent was run with its risk tra it set at the risk tolerant level (2.0) for all data
runs.
Once all role player data was collected, RPDAgent was provided with the same
decision scenario, and the model was run to collect its decisions for comparison against those of the role players. Since RPDAgent is a stochastic model, two hundred
replications were performed to obtain a distribution of RPDAgent’s decisions. Each
replication consisted of thirty decision sets representative of the thirty role player
decision sets. Each RPDAgent decision set contained a distribution of model deci
sions for each decision point. It was this distribution of decisions for each point th at
was compared to the role player decision distribution for each point. Specifically, the
mean for each decision from the two hundred replications was compared against the
number of role players th at made th at decision. Comparison results are presented in
Section 3.3.

3.2.2

S tatistical analysis m eth od

Standard statistical tests exist to compare a sample mean with a known population
mean with unknown population variance [91]. These tests allow one to determine
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whether the absolute difference between the sample mean and the population mean
is greater than zero.The statistical test would have

the following hypotheses:

h0 : \X - fi[ = 0
ha : \X — fj,\ > 0

where h0 is the null hypothesis, ha is the alternate hypothesis, X is the sample
mean, and jj, is the population mean. However, when performing statistical analysis
involving the complexity and uncertainty of human decision-making, determining if
the difference between model and human decisions is precisely zero is overly restrictive
and unrealistic. Instead, psychologists have developed significance tests to measure
if some pre-selected meaningful difference exits between a population mean and a
sample mean [92].
Unlike the hypothesis noted above, the purpose of significance testing is to de
termine whether two values are sufficiently close to one another to be considered
equivalent. Equivalency testing is appropriate if an investigator is able to specify
some small, non-zero difference between two values th a t would define an “equivalence
interval” around a difference of zero. Any difference th at falls within this interval
would be considered insignificant or acceptable.
Significance testing consists of two one-sided hypothesis tests. W ith the first test,
one seeks to reject the null hypothesis th at the difference between two values is less
than or equal to some value cq. W ith the second test, one seeks to reject the null
hypothesis th a t the difference between the two values is greater than or equal to
some value <52. For these tests, Si — —S2 and 5 represents the pre-selected allowable
equivalence difference.
If it can be shown th a t the difference between the two values comes from a distri
bution th at is simultaneously to the right of <5i and to the left of <52, one can conclude
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Test 1

Test 2

crit

crit

ha \ 8\ < X — fx < 8-,

Figure 14. One-sided hypothesis tests for significance testing [92]
th at the distribution it came from is somewhere in the middle with a true difference
less than the minimum difference of importance th a t was pre-selected. Figure 14 de
picts the two one-sided hypothesis tests. Table 18 lists the hypotheses for each test
and its associated test statistic. X represents the sample mean, jx represents the
population mean. The value,

is the standard error. The test statistic is the

student t test with the critical test statistic given as ta.

Table 18. Hypothesis and test statistics for significance testing
H y p o th esis
T est sta tistic
( X - fx ) - 8 1
ho X - j x < 8 x
Test 1 <
t\ —
X
f
x
>
8
i
ha
SX - p ,
^

Test 2 <

ho X - li > 82
ha X - jX < 8 2

£2

=

(.X - f x ) - S 2
sX-u
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To establish equivalency, one must reject the null hypothesis from both one-sided
tests. However, to accomplish this, one need only perform the calculations for one test,
provided th a t the investigator chooses the test with the smallest difference between
X —ji and <5i or S2. Choosing the smaller difference will yield the smallest test statistic
and consequently the larger p value of the two possible tests. If the test with the larger
p

value is rejected, the second test with the smaller p value will always be rejected.
To perform the one-sided significance test, one must also choose the acceptable

probability of a Type I error (a ).16 In some instances, when more than one statistical
test is required, a must be adjusted to account for test independence. However, for
significance testing, both tests are dependent. One test perfectly predicts the other so
no adjustm ent to a is required. The a selected for one test will accurately represent
the Type I error.
For the purpose of RPDAgent validation, equivalency between RPDAgent deci
sions and role player decisions was defined as having model results within twenty
percent of role player results. For example, if ten role players chose location Bravo as
the amphibious assault landing location, then the mean value of the number of times
RPDAgent selected location Bravo for its two hundred replications, must fall within
twenty percent of ten (8-12). Twenty percent was chosen because it is not too wide a
band to be unreasonable and not too narrow a band to account for human variability.
This was the criteria used to assess model validity and to determine if RPDAgent adequately mimicked the human decision process. Results of this assessment are
presented in Section 3.3.

3.3

D a ta analysis and results

This section presents the decision data obtained from the role players and RPDAgent.
It also presents the results of the significance tests between the two sets of data.
16In statistics, a Type I error is the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is actually
true. This probability is symbolized by a and is usually set to either 0.05 or 0.01.
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Table 19. Role player location decision results
L ocation decision N um ber o f players w ho chose
Alpha
0
21
Bravo
Charlie
4
5
Delta
Table 20. Role player timing decision results
T im in g decision N um ber o f players w ho chose
2
36 hours
48 hours
27
1
72 hours
96 hours
0
3.3.1

R ole player decision results

Thirty military officers, playing the role of a CJTF, participated in this research. They
were provided the decision scenario from Appendix B. Their decisions were recorded
on decision data sheets. The first decision point of the scenario asked them to select a
landing location for the amphibious assault based on the information provided. Table
19 shows the results of their decisions. One can see from the decision results that
humans make different decisions given the same scenario information. The variability
is a result of their past experience and how they interpret the information. RPDAgent
must be able to mimic this variability to successfully replicate the human decision
process.
The second decision point required the C JT F role players to decide on the timing
of the amphibious assault. Table 20 presents the results of their timing decisions.
After making the timing decision, the C JT F role players were presented with
unexpected troop movements th a t could affect the location and timing decisions.
They were asked to render a new decision based on this updated information. From
the thirty role players, three decisions emerged. Some decided to move the timing
up and execute the landing earlier, some decided to change the landing location, and
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Table 21. Roie player change decision results
C hange decision N um ber o f players w ho chose
On time
7
21
Go early
Change location
2
Table 22. Role player continue decision results
C ontinue decision N u m ber o f players who chose
21
Continue
W ithdraw
9
some decided to go as scheduled at the previously selected location. Their decision
distribution is presented in Table 21.
Once the amphibious landing was completed, the scenario presented a situation
where the landing force encountered unexpected enemy opposition and larger than
expected casualty rates. Role players were asked for a decision on whether to continue
the assault or to abort it. Table 22 presents the results of this decision.

3.3.2

M od el decision resu lts a n d analysis

This section will present the results of RPDAgent’s mean decision values over the two
hundred replications th a t were run. Equivalency was tested per the twenty percent
equivalency level mentioned above. Additionally, results of ten percent equivalency
tests will also be presented to help judge model performance. For all statistical tests,
the a Type I error level chosen was 0.05 giving a critical test statistic ta = 1.645.
Table 23 provides basic statistical data for each location decision. This d ata is
based on the two hundred replications. Table 24 provides the results of the model lo
cation decisions and the test statistic (t) for each decision. For all decisions, |i| > ta.
These tests support the rejection of all null hypotheses, indicating th at the model
decisions are equivalent with the role player decisions within the twenty percent equivalency band. Test results from ten percent equivalency testing are also included.
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Table 23.
A ction
Alpha
Bravo
Charlie
Delta

Location decision descriptive statistics
M inim um MaLximum M ean S td . D eviation
0
0
0
0
13
27
21.745 2.4185
0
12
3.955
1.8976
11
0
4.3
1.9257

T a b le 24. Model location decision results and analysis
20% eq uivalence
A ctio n H um an M odel s
20% S t
Alpha
0
0
0
0
na
21
Bravo
21.745
0.1710 4.2
-20.2047
Charlie 4
0.1341 0.8
3.955
5.6301
5
4.3
Delta
0.1361 1.0
2.2043

10% eq uivalence
10% S t
na
0
-7.924
2.1
0.4
2.6473
0.5
-1.4695

These results show th at the Bravo and Charlie decisions fall within this equivalency
band. Decision Delta is not equivalent at the ten percent difference level.
Presented next, in Tables 25 and 26, are the model results from the timing decision
with its corresponding statistical analysis. Once again model results are equivalent
with the role player results at the twenty percent equivalency level. The ^5 hour
decision was equivalent at the ten percent level.
Results from the change decision are shown in Tables 27 and 28. Statistical tests
again show th a t the model results are equivalent to the C JT F role player’s decisions
at the selected twenty percent level. Here, only the change location decision is not
equivalent at the ten percent level.
The fourth and final decision point concerned the decision to withdraw from the
landing zone because of unexpected enemy opposition and greater than expected
friendly casualties. Tables 29 and 30 shows th a t all decisions are again equivalent at
the twenty percent level. The continue decision was not equivalent at the narrower
equivalency level.
Summarizing the above results, all model decisions were determined to be equiv
alent to the role player decision results when calculated using the twenty percent
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Table 25.
A ctio n
36 hours
48 hours
72 hours
96 hours

Timing decision descriptive statistics
M inim um M axim um M e a n S td. D eviation
0
1.87
6
1.4981
22
27.04
1.7532
30
4
0
1.09
0.9033
0
0
0
0

Table 26. Model timing decision results and analysis
20% eq uivalence
A ction
H um an M odel s
20% 8 t
36 hours 2
0.1059 0.4
1.87
2.5496
27.04
48 hours 27
-43.2607
0.1239 5.4
-1.7241
72 hours 1
1.09
0.0638 0.2
96 hours 0
na
0
0
0

Table 27. Change decision descriptive statist ics
A ctio n
M in im u m M ax im u m M ean
On time
3
14
7.2
Go early
16
26
20.755
Change location 0
6
1.825

10% ec[uivalence
10% 5 t
0.2
0.6610
2.7
-21.4689
0.1
-0.1567
0
na

Std. D eviation
2.0529
2.1395
1.2777

Table 28. Model change decision resul' ;s and analysis
20% eq uivalence
A ction
H um an M odel s
20% 5 t
On time 7
7.42
0.1451 1.4
-6.7540
Go early 21
0.1512 4.2
26.1574
20.755
Change
2
1.825
0.0903 0.4
2.4917
location

10% eq uivalence
10% 5 t
-1.9297
0.7
2.1
-12.2685
0.2
0.2769

Table 29. Continue decision descriptive statistics
M inim um M a x im u m M ean Std. D ev ia tio n
A ction
12
Continue
28
2.3917
22.09
Withdraw 2
18
2.3917
7.91

Table 30. Model continue decision and analysis
20% eq uivalence
A ction
H um an M odel s
20% 5 t
21
Continue
22.09
0.1691 4.2
-18.3915
Withdraw 9
7.91
0.1691 1.8
4.1987

10% eq[uivalence
10% 8 t
2.1
-5.9728
-1.1236
0.9
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T a b le 31. Equivalency test summary
D ec isio n
A c tio n
E q u iv a le n t a t
20% level 10% level
L o c a tio n
Alpha
na
na
Bravo
yes
yes
Charlie
yes
yes
Delta
no
yes
T im in g
36 hours
yes
no
48 hours
yes
yes
72 hours
yes
no
96 hours
na
na
C hange
On time
yes
yes
Go early
yes
yes
Change location yes
no
C o n tin u e Continue
yes
yes
W ithdraw
no
yes
equivalency difference th at was specified during validation design. Six of the eleven
model decisions were shown to be equivalent to the surrogate C JTF decisions when
examined using the ten percent equivalency test. Table 31 summarizes these results.

3.3.3

A T u rin g te s t an aly sis o f m o d e l re s u lts

The section above described the model results in terms of a statistical comparison
between its decisions and human decisions. In a purely mathematical comparison, one
could argue th at there are subtleties between the model decisions and the decisions
made by humans th at statistics may not identify. To ensure th at these subtleties are
not overlooked, an additional test, patterned after the Turing test proposed by Alan
Turing, was conducted.
Turing’s original concept of the Turing test was a method to determine if a com
puter had achieved intelligence [93]. The test consisted of a human interrogator who
could pose questions and receive answers from two hidden respondents; the respon
dents could be either human or a computer system. The questions and answers were
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transm itted in an impersonal manner such as a computer terminal. The interrogator’s
goal was to determine which of the respondents was a man and which was a woman.
The computer system would pass the Turing Test if the interrogator was no more like
ly to identify the man from the woman if one of the respondents was a computer vice
when both were humans. Since Turing originally posed this test, another form of the
test has evolved. This test specifies th at the goal of the interrogator is to determine
if a single responder is a computer or a human. It is this form of the test th at was
used to measure RPDAgent’s decision-mimicking ability. This test would determine
whether human experts were able to identify a set of computer decisions from a set of
human decisions through some pattern not identified by statistical equivalency test
ing. The Turing test has been previously used to assess computer generated behavior
at the tactical level [94, 95]. The utility of the Turing test for such assessments has
been widely asserted [96].
The test consisted of twenty sets of decisions.

Each set represented the four

decision points from the amphibious assault scenario. The twenty sets were selected
at random from among the thirty human decision sets obtained from the role players
and thirty computer decision sets generated by one replication run of RPDAgent.
Selecting twenty decision sets from the sixty available sets allowed for a possible
4.19xl015 combinations of sets. Two such groups of twenty sets of decisions were
generated and used in the test. The two groups are listed in Appendix E along
with the test instructions provided to the subject m atter experts. Test one contained
eleven human decision sets and nine computer decision sets. Test two contained seven
human and thirteen computer. Four subject m atter experts responded to test number
one and one responded to test number two. These assignments were made by one of
the general officers. All responses were independent of one another.
The subject m atter experts consisted of a total of five general officers from the U.
S. Army and Air Force. Three of the five general officers were of the rank of General

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

95

T a b le 32, Turing test results
N u m b er of N u m b er of
SM E
“c a n ’t te ll” “h u m a n ” o r
re sp o n se s
“c o m p u te r”
re sp o n ses
0
GEN. A 20
14
GEN. B 6
7
GEN. C 13
2
GEN. D 18
GEN. E 17
3

N u m b e r of
c o rre c t “h u m a n ”
o r “c o m p u te r”
resp o n ses

P e rc e n ta g e
c o rre c t

0
8
3
2
2

0
40%
15%
10%
10%

(four star). Two were of the rank of Lieutenant General (three star). All were retired
officers with significant joint task force experience including command of a JT F or
its equivalent. Per the test instructions, they were asked to attem pt to identify the
source of each decision set. They had three choices: “human” , “computer” , or “can’t
tell” . Their selection results are presented in Table 32. Column one identifies each
subject m atter expert (SME). Column two lists the number of sets (out of twenty)
th at each SME said they could identify a computer decision from a human decision.
The third column lists the number of correct assessments from the ones they could
identify. The fourth column lists the percentage correct out of twenty sets.
To analyze the Turing test results of Table 32, one can compare the number of
correct assessments to the expected number of successes by purely guessing the results.
The expected number of successes (S)17 from purely guessing can be represented by
a Bernoulli calculation [97].
S = np

(17)

Equation 17 represents this calculation where S is the expected number of successes,
n is the number of trials (20), and p is the probability of success. For all trials,
it is assumed th at each SME had a fifty percent probability of guessing correctly.
Therefore, the expected number of successes from purely guessing is (20) * (0.5) =
17Success is defined as correctly identifying the source of the decision set.
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10. The number of correct identifications produced by the SMEs is fewer than the
number to be expected from random guessing. Even if the seventy-four SME “can’t
tell” responses are assumed to be replaced with guesses with p = 0.5, this produces
15 + (0.5)74 = 52 assumed successes, a number not statistically greater than pure
guessing. These results indicate th at it is unlikely th at a pattern of decisions exist
th at would allow human observers to distinguish the computer decisions from the
human decisions.
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4

CONCLUSION

The motivation for this research stemmed from the lack of adequate decision mod
els within military simulations. Most of the existing simulations modeled decision
making in a very homogeneous and rigid manner. When provided with the same
input, models produced the same output time after time. Human decision models
also did not account for personality traits th at influenced decisions.
The above shortcomings were especially true when looking at decision modeling at
the operational level of warfare. Most decision models were centered around tactical
decisions. Capturing the decision process of a senior military commander was almost
non-existent.
Previous attem pts at producing a computational model th at mimicked the human
decision process were centered around rule-based models with classical decision theory
as the underlying cognitive process. In most decision situations facing operational mil
itary commanders, the decision process they employ is not characterized by classical
concepts. Their decision process was centered more on Naturalistic Decision Theory
of which RPD is the primary model. To adequately mimic their decision-making, a
computational model of RPD was required.
Multiagent system simulation was evaluated as the best computational method
with which to implement the RPD process. The autonomous, goal orientated nature
of MAS, closely resembled the cognitive process described by RPD. MAS supported
the use of an experience data base and mental simulation to closely capture how
decision makers, experienced in their domain of expertise, drew on this experience to
arrive at a decision th at would satisfy the situation.
As a result, this research developed a computational model of RPD using mul
tiagent system simulation techniques th at was able to produce decisions equivalent
to those made by C JT F role players. In doing so, the concepts of situational aware
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ness, the recognition process, and the action selection process were captured in a
mathem atical form th at accurately modeled RPD and C JTF decision-making at the
operational level of warfare.
4.1

F uture work

This research is significant in th at it produced the contributions noted in Section
1.5. Additionally, it has opened the door and formed the basis for further research in
many areas. These areas include:
1. Incorporating R P D A gen t into an existin g sim ulation. To assess the
effectiveness of RPDAgent against existing decision methodologies, RPDAgent
could be incorporated into an existing military simulation and its performance
could be measured against the simulation without RPDAgent incorporated.
2. Incorporating th e influence o f Joint Task Force S ta ff decisions in to
th e C JT F decision m odel. In some situations, a C JTF may not possess the
domain expertise to render a satisfactory decision for a given situation. He must
rely on his staff to provide him with recommendations on how to proceed. Yet,
he has the experience to recognize what staff recommendations will produce
satisfactory results.

Capturing this group synergy could form the basis for

modeling the entire JT F staff decision process.
3. C reating an exp erien ce base th a t w ould allow th e m odel to m ake
all ty p es o f C JT F decisions. This research was limited by a single deci
sion scenario th a t represented the type of operational decision facing a C JTF.
Expanding the experience base to allow for generalized C JTF decision-making
would be necessary for employing this model in a broad military environment.
4. R esearching fuzzy set shape and its influence on exp erience represen
ta tio n . The fuzzy sets chosen for RPDAgent were triangular in nature. O ther
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fuzzy set shapes, and the extent of those sets, may influence the embodiment
of experience in different ways. Research is required to determine the nature of
this influence and its effect on decisions.
5. B e t t e r defin in g m e a su re s o f ris k to le ra n c e a n d its re la tio n s h ip to m il
ita ry decisions. While research exists th at link specific personality traits to
risk tolerance, no studies have been conducted th at precisely measure one’s tol
erance for risk and its direct influence on the decisions they have made or are
likely to make. Also, one could explore the sensitivity of decisions to the risk
tolerance factor encoded in the model.
6. B e tte r defining th e person ality traits affecting senior m ilitary com 
m ander decisions. Risk was a readily identifiable personality trait th at influ
enced an operational military commander’s decision process. Further research
is required to determine if other traits have a significant influence in this type
of decision-making.
7. Incorporation o f dynam ic action generation. RPDAgent currently has
a fixed set of actions from which it may choose for a given decision experi
ence. Providing the capability to dynamically generate potential actions would
increase the sophistication of the model.
8. Incorporation o f learning. RPDAgent has the potential to learn based on
its decisions. Incorporating learning would help improve its decision quality.
Learning could be incorporated through its goal satisfaction mechanism. Re
search is required to devise a methodology th at could adequately perform this
function.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

100

5

REFERENCES

Moore, S., 1999. Joint Warfighting Center Command Briefing. Presented to
Congressional Staff Members, June.
Pew, R. W. and A. S. Mavor. 1998. Modeling Human and Organizational Behav
ior: Application to Military Simulations. National Academy Press, Washington
D. C.
Joint Staff. 2000. Joint Pub 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military
and Associated Terms. Government Printing Office, Washington D. C.
Joint Staff. 1995. Joint Pub 3-0: Doctrine for Joint Operations. Government
Printing Office, Washington D. C.
Personal knowledge.
Erwin, S. I. 2000. Simulation of Human Behavior Helps M ilitary Training Models.
National Defense, 85(564) :32-35.
United States Congress. 1986. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1987 (commonly: Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganiza
tion Act of 1986), Public Law No. 433. GPO, Washington D. C.
Cole, R. H. 1995. OPERATION JUST CAUSE: The Planning and Execution of
Joint Operations in Panam a February 1988 - January 1990. Government Printing
Office, Washington D. C.
9 Dorsey, J., 2003. Command in Norfolk Takes on Job of Innovation. The Virginian
Pilot, January 2.
[10 Department of Defense. 1995. Modeling and Simulation Master Plan. Govern
ment Printing Office, Washington D. C.
[11 Erwin, S. I. 2001. Commanders Want Realistic Simulations. National Defense,

85(567) :50-51.
[12 Coppieters, D. 2001. The Increasing Need for the Representation of Decision

Making and Human Behaviour in Simulations used for Computer Assisted Ex
ercises in NATO. Tech Report RTO-ENP-017, NATO Research and Technology
Organization, Cedex, FR.
[13] Beach, L. R. and R. Lipshitz. 1993. Why Classical Decision Theory is an In
appropriate Standard for Evaluating and Aiding Most Human Decision Making.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

101
In Klein, G., J. Orasanu, R. Calderwood, and C. E. Zsambok, editors, Deci
sion Making in Action: Models and Methods. Ablex Publishing Corporation,
Norwood, NJ, pp 21-35.
[14] von Neumann, J. and 0 . Morgenstern. 1953. Theory of Games and Economic
Behavior. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
[15] Clemen, R. T. 1996. Making Hard Decisions: A n Introduction to Decision
Analysis. Duxbury Press, Pacific Grove, CA.
[16] Lehto, M. R. 1997. Decision Making. In Salvendy, G., editor, Handbook of Human
Factors and Ergonomics. John Wiley and Sons, Inc, New York, pp 1201-1248.
[17] Keeney, R. L. and H. Raiffa. 1976. Decisions with Multiple Objectives: Prefer
ences and Value Tradeoffs. John Wiley and Sons, Inc, New York.
[18] Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky. 1979. Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk. Econometrica, 47(2):263-291.
[19] Klein, G. 1998. Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions. The MIT Press,
Cambridge, MA.
[20] Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman. 1974. Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases. Science, 185:1124-1131.
[21] Klein, G. 1989. Strategies of Decision Making. Military Review, 69(5):56-64.
[22] Klein, G. 1993. A Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) Model of Rapid Decision
Making. In Klein, G., J. Orasanu, R. Calderwood, and C. E. Zsambok, editors,
Decision Making in Action: Models and Methods. Ablex Publishing Corporation,
Norwood, NJ, pp 138-147.
[23] Pascual, R. and S. Henderson. 1997. Evidence of Naturalistic Decision Making in
Military Command and Control. In Zsambok, C. E. and G. Klein, editors, Nat
uralistic Decision Making. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, Mahwah,
NJ, pp 217-226.
[24] Simon, H. A. 1957. Models of man: social and rational mathematical essays
on rational human behavior in a social setting. John Wiley and Sons, Inc, New
York.
[25] Simon, H. A. 1981. The Sciences of the Artificial. John Wiley and Sons, Inc,
New York.
[26] Orasanu, J. and T. Connolly. 1993. The Reinvention of Decision Making. In
Klein, G., J. Orasanu, R. Calderwood, and C. E. Zsambok, editors, Decision
Making in Action: Models and Methods. Ablex Publishing Corporation, Nor
wood, NJ, pp 3-20.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

102
[27] Zsambok, C. E. 1997. Naturalistic Decision Making: Where are We now? In
Zsambok, C. E. and G. Klein, editors, Naturalistic Decision M aking. Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, Mahwah, NJ, pp 3-16.
[28] Endsley, M. R. 1997. The Role of Situational Awareness in Naturalistic Decision
Making. In Zsambok, C. E. and G. Klein, editors, N a tu r a lis tic D e c isio n M aking.
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, Mahwah, NJ, pp 269-284.
[29] Randel, J. M. and H. L. Pugh. 1996. Differences in Expert and Novice Situation
Awareness in Naturalistic Decision Making. I n te r n a tio n a l J o u rn a l o f H u m a n C o m p u te r S tu d ie s, 45:579-597.
[30] Kurzweil, R. 1999. T h e A g e o f S p ir itu a l M a ch in e s. Penguin Books, New York,
NY.
[31] Zhang, W. and R. W. Ford, Jr. 2000. Situation Awareness and Assessment An Integrated Approach and Applications. In P ro ceed in g s o f th e N in th C o n fe r
en ce on C o m p u te r G e n e ra te d F orces a n d B e h a v io r a l R e p r e s e n ta tio n , May 16-18,
Orlando, FL, pp 365-376.
[32] Brunswick, E. 1955. Representative Design and Probabilistic Theory In a Func
tional Psychology. P syc h o lo g ica l R e v ie w , 62:193-217.
[33] Brehmer, B. and R. Hagafors. 1986. Use of Experts in Complex Decision Making:
A Paradigm for the Study of Staff Work. O r g a n iza tio n a l B e h a v io r a n d H u m a n
D e c is io n P ro ce sses, 38:181-195.
[34] Hollenbeck, J. R., D. R. Ilgen, D. J. Sego, J. Hedlund, D. A. Major, and J.
Phillips. 1995. Multilevel Theory of Team Decision Making: Decision Perfor
mance in Teams Incorporating Distributed Expertise. J o u rn a l o f A p p lie d P s y 
chology, 80(2):292-316.
[35] Joint Staff. 1995. Joint Pub 5-0: Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations. Gov
ernment Printing Office, Washington D. C.
[36] Joint Staff. 1996. Joint Pub 3-13.1: Joint Doctrine for Command and Control
Warfare (C2W). Government Printing Office, Washington D. C.
[37] Boyd, J. R. 1987. A Discourse on Winning and Losing. Tech Report MU 43947,
Air University Library.
[38] Rinaldi, S. M. 1997. Complexity Theory and Airpower: A New Paradigm
for Airpower in the 21st Century. In C o m p le x ity , G lobal P o litic s , a n d N a tio n a l
S e c u rity . National Defense University Command and Control Research Program,
pp 247-302.
[39] Drillings, M. and D. Serfaty. 1997. Naturalistic Decision Making in Command
and Control. In Zsambok, C. E. and G. Klein, editors, N a tu r a lis tic D e c is io n
M aking. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, Mahwah, NJ, pp 71-80.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

103
[40] Kaempf, G. L., G. Klein, M. L. Thorsden, and S. Wolfe. 1996. Decision Mak
ing in Complex Naval Command-and-Control Environments. Human F a cto rs,
38(2): 220-231.
[41] Serfaty, D., J. MacMillan, E. E. Enton, and E. B. Enton. 1997. The DecisionMaking Expertise of Battle Commanders. In Zsambok, C. E. and G. Klein,
editors, N a tu r a lis tic D e c isio n M akin g. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers,
Mahwah, NJ, pp 233-246.
[42] Gill, A. 1962. In tro d u c tio n to th e th e o ry o f f in ite - s ta te m a ch in e s. McGraw-Hill,
New York.
[43] Calder, R. B., A. J. Courtemanche, A. M. F. Mar, and A. Z. Ceranowicz. 1993.
ModSAF Behavior Simulation and Control. In P ro ceed in g s o f th e T h ird C o n 
fe r e n c e o n C o m p u te r G e n e ra te d F orces a n d B e h a v io r a l R e p r e se n ta tio n , March
17-19, Orlando, FL, pp 347-356.
[44] Downes-Martin, S., 1995.
A Survey of Human Behavior Represen
tation Activities for Distributed Interactive Simulations:
Final Report.
http://www.msiac.dmso.mil/hobm_documents/lFINALE.W RD.doc.
[45] Gallant, S. I. 1995. N e u ra l N e tw o r k L e a rn in g a n d E x p e r t S y s te m s . The MIT
Press, Cambridge, MA.
[46] Laird, J. E., A. Newell, and P. S. Rosenbloom. 1987. SOAR: An Architecture
for General Intelligence. A r tif ic ia l In te llig e n c e , 33:1-64.
[47] Burns, K., 2001. Mental Models and Normal Errors in Naturalistic Decision
Making. Presented at the Workshop on Computerized Representation of RPD,
Boulder, CO, October 23.
[48] Jones, R. M., J. E. Laird, P. E. Neilson, K. J. Coulter, P. Kenny, and F. V.
Koss. Automated Intelligent Pilots for Combat Flight Simulations. A I M a g a zin e ,
20(1):27.
[49] Kolodner, J. L. 1991. Improving Human Decision Making through Case-Based
Decision Aiding. A I M a g a zin e , 12(2):52-68.
[50] Kolodner, J. L. 1993. C a se-b a se d rea so n in g . Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, San
Mateo, CA.
[51] Arditi, D. and 0 . B. Tokdemir. 1999. Comparison of Case-Based Reasoning
and Artificial Neural Networks. J o u r n a l o f C o m p u tin g in C iv il E n g in ee rin g ,
13(3):162—169.
[52] Gilboa, I. and D. Schmeidler. 1995. Case-Based Decision Theory. T h e Q u a r te r ly
J o u rn a l o f E c o n o m ic s, 110(3):605-639.
[53] Mitchell, T. M. 1997. M a c h in e L ea rn in g . McGraw-Hill, Boston, MA.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

104
[54 Liang, Y., F. Robichaud, B. J. Fugere, and K. N. Ackles. 2001. Implementing
a Naturalistic Command Agent Design. In P roceedin gs o f th e T en th C o n feren ce
o n C o m p u te r G e n e ra te d F orces , May 15-17, Norfolk, VA, pp 379-386.
[55 Zadeh, L. A. 1975. F u zzy s e ts a n d th e ir a p p lic a tio n s to c o g n itiv e a n d d e c is io n
p ro c e sse s. Academic Press, New York.
[56 Robichaud, F., 2001. Implementing a Naturalistic Command Agent Design.
Presented at the Workshop on Computerized Representation of RPD, Boulder,
CO, October 23.
[57 Vakas, D., J. Prince, H. R. Blacksten, and C. Burdick. 2001. Commander
Behavior and Course of Action Selection in JWARS. In P ro ce ed in g s o f th e T en th
C o n feren ce on C o m p u te r G e n e ra te d F orces, May 15-17, Norfolk, VA, pp 387-398.
[58 George, G. R. and F. Cardullo. 1999. Application of Neuro-Fuzzy Systems to
Behavioral Representation in Computer Generated Forces. In P ro ceed in g s o f th e
E ig h th C o n feren ce on C o m p u te r G e n e ra te d F orces a n d B e h a v io r a l R e p r e s e n ta 
tio n ,

May 11-13, Orlando, FL, pp 575-585.

[59 Minsky, M. L. 1986. T h e S o c ie ty o f M in d . Simon and Schuster, New York.
[60 Weiss, G. 1999. M u ltia g e n t s y s te m s : A m o d e m a pproach to d is trib u te d a rtific ia l
in te llig en ce . The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
[61 Roddy, K. and M. Dickson. 2000. Modeling Human and Organizational Behavior
Using a Relation-Centric Multi-Agent System Design Paradigm. Masters thesis,
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.
[62 Ferber, J. 1998. M u lti-a g e n t s y s te m s : A n in tro d u c tio n to d is tr ib u te d a r tific ia l
in te llig en ce . Addison-Wesley, Harlow.
[63 Langton, C. G.

1991. A r tif ic ia l life II: T h e p ro ceed in g s o f th e w o rk sh o p on
a r tific ia l life h eld F e b ru a ry 1 9 9 0 in S a n ta Fe, N e w M exico. Addison-Wesley,
Redwood City, CA.

[64 Hiles, J., M. VanPutte, B. Osborn, and M. J. Zyda. 2001. Innovations in Com
puter Generated Autonomy. Tech Report NPS-MV-02-002, Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, CA.
[65 Warwick, W., S. Mcllwaine, R. Hutton, and P. McDermott. 2001. Developing
Computational Models of Recognition-Primed Decision Making. In P ro ceed in g s
o f th e T en th C o n feren ce on C o m p u te r G e n e ra te d F orces, May 15-17, Norfolk,
VA, pp 323-331.
[66] Hintzman, D. L. 1984. MINERVA 2: A Simulation Model of Human Memory.
B e h a v io r R esea rc h M eth o d s, I n s tr u m e n ts a n d C o m p u te rs, 16:96-101.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

105
[67] Norling, E., L. Sonenberg, and R. Ronnquist. 2000. Enhancing Multi-Agent
Based Simulation with Human-Like Decision Making Strategies. In Multi-Agent
B a s e d Simulation: P roceedin gs of th e S econ d I n te r n a tio n a l Workshop, M A B S
2000, Boston, MA, Springer, pp 214-228.
[68] Bratm an, M. E. 1987. In te n tio n s , P la n s, a n d P r a c tic a l R eason . Harvard Uni
versity Press, Cambridge, MA.
[69] DeLoach, S. A., 2001. Analysis and Design using MaSE and agentTool. Presented
at the 12th Midwest Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science Conference
(MAICS 2001), Mar 31-April 1.
[70] DeLoach, S. A., M. F. Wood, and C. H. Sparkman. 2001. Multiagent Systems Engineering. I n te r n a tio n a l J o u rn a l o f S o ftw a re E n g in e e rin g a n d K n o w le d g e
E n g in ee rin g , ll(3):231-258.
[71] Deitel, H. M. and P. J. Deitel. 2002. Java: H o w to P ro g ra m . Prentice Hall,
Upper Saddle River, NJ, 4th edition.
[72] Minsky, M. L. 1995. A Framework for Representing Knowledge. In Luger, G. F.,
editor, C o m p u ta tio n a n d In te llig e n c e . AAAI Press, Menlo Park, CA, pp 163-189.
[73] Page, M. 1987. Risk in Defence. In Singleton, W. T. and J. Hovden, editors,
R is k a n d D e c isio n s. John Wiley and Sons, Ltd., London, UK, pp 191-205.
[74] Rao, V. B. and H. V. Rao. 1995. C + + N e u ra l N e tw o r k s a n d F u zzy Logic. MIS
Press, New York, NY.
[75] Raumbaugh, J., I. Jacobson, and G. Booch. 1999. T h e U n ified M o d elin g L a n 
gu age R efe ren ce M an u al. Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA.
[76] Wooldridge, M. 2002. A n In tro d u c tio n to M u lti A g e n t S y s te m s . John Wiley and
Sons, LTD., West Sussex, England.
[77] Bigus, J. P. and J. Bigus. 2001. C o n stru c tin g I n te llig e n t A g e n ts U sin g Ja va .
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New York, NY.
[78] Sprinkle, J., C. vanBuskirk, and G. Karsai. 2000. Modeling Agent Negotiation.
In IE E E I n te r n a tio n a l C o n feren ce on S y s te m s , M a n , a n d C y b e rn e tic s, Oct 8,
Nashville, TN, pp 454-459.
[79] Randel, J. M., H. L. Pugh, and B. G. Wyman. January 1996. Methods for
Conducting Cognitive Task Analysis for a Decision Making Task. Tech Report
TN-96-10, Naval Personnel Research and Development Center, San Diego, CA.
[80] Gorgon, S. E. and R. T. Gill. 1997. Cognitive Task Analysis. In Zsambok,
C. E. and G. Klein, editors, N a tu r a lis tic D e c is io n M ak in g . Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates, Publishers, Mahwah, NJ, pp 131-140.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

106
[81] Gott, S., 1994. Cognitive Task Analysis. Panel discussion at the Second Confer
ence on Naturalistic Decision Making, Dayton, OH, June.
[82] Fuquea, D. C. W inter 1997. Bougainville: The Amphibious Assault Enters
Maturity. N a v a l W a r C ollege R evie w , L(l).
[83] Alexancer, J. H. and M. L. Bartlett. 1995. S ea Soldiers in the C o ld W ar. Naval
Institute Press, Annapolis, MD.
[84] Alexancer, J. H. 1997. Storm L an din gs. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD.
[85] Ferguson, M., 2002. Personal communication, May.
[86] Hoffman, R. R., B. Crandall, and N. Shadbolt. 1998. Use of the Critical Deci
sion Method to Elicit Expert Knowledge: A Case Study in the Methodology of
Cognitive Task Analysis. H u m a n F a cto rs: T h e J o u r n a l o f th e H u m a n F a cto rs
S o c ie ty , 40(2):254-277.
[87] Balci, O.

1998. Verification, Validation, and Testing. In Banks, J., editor,
H an dbook o f S im u la tio n . John Wiley and Sons, New York, NY, chapter 10, pp
335-393.

[88] International Personality Item Pool, 2001. A Scientific Colaboratory for the
Development of Advanced Measures of Personality Traits and Other Individual
Differences, h ttp : / /ip ip .ori.org/ , September.
[89] Goldberg, L. R. 1999. A Broad-Bandwidth, Public Domain, Personality In
ventory Measuring the Lower-Level Facets of Several Five-Factor Models. In
Mervielde, I., I. Deary, F. DeFruyt, and F. Ostendorf, editors, P e r s o n a lity P s y 
ch ology in E u rope, volume 7. Tilburg University Press, Tilburg, The Netherlands,
pp 7-28.
[90] Lauriola, M. and I. P. Levin. 2001. Personality Traits and Risky DecisionMaking in a Controlled Experimental Task: An Exploratory Study. P e r s o n a lity
a n d I n d iv id u a l D ifferen ces, 31:215-226.
[91] Bruning, J. L. and B. L. Kintz. 1996. C o m p u ta tio n a l H an dbook o f S ta tis tic s .
Addison Wesley, New York, NY, 4th edition.
[92] Rogers, J. L., K. I. Howard, and J. T. Vessey. 1993. Using Significance Tests to Evaluate Equivalence Between Two Experimental Groups. P syc h o lo g ica l
B u lle tin , 113(3):553-565.
[93] Turing, A. 1950. Computing Machinery and Intelligence. M in d , 59(236):433-460.
[94] Potomac. 1990. Report of the Evaluation of the Representation of SemiAutomated Forces (SAF) in the SIMNET Model. Technical report, Potomac
Systems Engineering, Inc., Annandale, VA.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

107
[95] Wise, B. P., D. Miller, and A. Z. Ceranowicz. 1991. A Framework for Evaluating
Computer Generated Forces. In P ro ceed in g s o f th e S eco n d B e h a v io ra l R e p r e s e n 
ta tio n a n d C o m p u te r G e n e ra te d F orces S y m p o siu m , May 6-7, Orlando, FL, pp
H1-H7.
[96] Petty, M. D. 1994. The Turing Test as an Evaluation Criterion for Computer
Generated Forces. In P roceedin gs o f th e F o u rth C o n feren ce on C o m p u te r G e n e r 
a te d F orces a n d B e h a v io ra l R e p r e s e n ta tio n , May 4-6, Orlando, FL, pp 107-116.
[97] Roberts, F. S. 1984. A p p lie d C o m b in a to r ic s. Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood
Cliffs, NJ.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

A

RPDAGENT COMPUTER DISK

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

109

B

DECISION SCENARIO AND ASSOCIATED DATA
R oad to War

The country of Cain has had a border dispute with the country of Abel for the past 50
years. Cain leaders believed th at the Abel leaders deceived their forefathers when the
borders were drawn. The deception consisted of not telling the Cains about the vast
oil reserves th at existed near the border region. The Cains have tried to peacefully
renegotiate the border with little success.
Two years ago, a militant faction of the Cains came into power. They immediately
began planning an invasion of Abel to claim an area of the disputed border region,
which Cain felt was an equitable division of the oil reserves. Coincidentally, the
disputed region also contained Abel’s main port for oil distribution to other countries.
Three months ago, Cain launched a military campaign. The Cain army forcibly
invaded Abel and took possession of the disputed territory, including the port of
Willing.
Cain’s military strength exceeded Abel’s by a factor of 5:1. Despite courageous
fighting by Abel’s military, they could not force the Cains from their occupied land.
Abel appealed to the international community for military assistance. The interna
tional community agreed to assist Abel and has formed a coalition joint task force to
provide military assistance to them. In addition to the illegal seizure of Abel land,
the international community also felt th a t the disruption of oil production and dis
tribution, caused by the invasion, would adversely affect the world’s oil supply, and
thus would not be tolerated.
As Commander Joint Task Force (CJTF) Echo, your mission is to regain control
of the illegally seized territory and to restore the use of the port of Willing. To
accomplish this mission, you have divided your assigned forces into two separate task
forces. The main force, Task Force Terrier (Corps size ground element), will conduct
a land campaign to drive the Cains from the occupied land. They will be staged in
Abel and approach the occupied territory from the south and west. The other task
force, Task Force Gator, (Marine Expeditionary Brigade size Marine unit with two
supporting Amphibious Ready Groups) will conduct a supporting amphibious assault
as a diversion and to cut off the Cain’s lines of communication and resupply. The
focus of this experiment will be on the decisions related to operational command of
the amphibious assault.
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Task Force G ator C om m ander’s Intent
M issio n Conduct an amphibious assault along the southern border of Cain or eastern
border of Abel to interdict their lines of communication and to prevent resupply
of their ground forces.
I n te n t We will use the surprise and mobility of our amphibious assault capability
to overwhelm the enemy’s shore defenses, seize control of the landing area,
and deploy forces inland to sever communications and interdict resupply of
Cain forces in the occupied territory while minimizing damage to the country’s
infrastructure. Air Force assets will augment the organic amphibious air combat
element in a close air support role. The landing will be synchronized with Task
Force Terrier to ensure proper support of th at effort.
End sta te Complete disruption of communication, all land-based resupply efforts
stopped, enemy resistance neutralized.
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D ecision P oin ts
D ecisio n s itu a tio n no. 1— The first decision facing you as the coalition C JTF is
approving the choice of the amphibious assault landing area. There are 4 possible
landing sites th at exist along the coasts of Abel and Cain. All are approachable from
the Bay of Willing (see Figure 15).
Location Alpha is situated along the coast of Abel within the territory occupied
by the Cains. It has a shallow beach slope with a 3 ft. wall th a t separates the beach
from the adjoining road. The water adjacent to the beach is shallow with moderate
tides and a severe rip current. There is no suitable anchorage near the beach. The
beach has reportedly been mined; concrete barriers have been placed in the surf near
the beach. The beach has adequate staging area for landing troops and supplies and
adequate routes to access the Cains’ lines of communication (5 miles to the main land
supply route and communication lines, 7 miles to the main supply staging area, 113
miles to the supply depot and communication center.) A brigade-size force consisting
of infantry, artillery, and tanks defends the landing zone. These troops are some of
the most skilled in the Cain military and are backed up by close air support (CAS).
No significant naval threat exists in this area. Coalition intelligence believes the Cains
consider this area a likely assault site. They rate the above landing zone assessment
as excellent.
Location Bravo is situated along the coast of Cain and is the closest landing zone
outside the occupied territory. It has a moderate beach slope, fine-grained sand, and
jungle growth on the shore side of the beach. The water adjacent to the beach is
of moderate depth with a small tide range and a moderate rip current. A suitable
anchorage is available near the beach. There are no known mines or barriers either on
the beach or in its adjacent water. The beach has adequate staging area for landing
troops and supplies and adequate routes to access the Cains’ lines of communication
(8 miles to the main land supply route and communication lines, 20 miles to the
main supply staging area, 100 miles to the supply depot and communication center.)
A company-sized force of experienced soldiers defends the beach with infantry and
artillery. Troop strength is expected to increase in this area. CAS does not support
them. A small naval force consisting of 4 patrol boats is operating in the area.
Coalition intelligence believes the Cains consider this area a likely assault site. They
rate the above landing zone assessment as excellent.
Location Charlie is situated along the coast of Cain. It has a moderate beach
slope, coarse-grained sand, and jungle growth on the shore side of the beach. The
water adjacent to the beach is deep with a large tide range and a severe undertow. A
suitable anchorage is available near the beach. The beach and surf are not believed
to be mined but there are concrete barriers in the surf near the beach. The beach
has adequate staging area for landing troops and supplies and adequate routes to
access the Cains’ lines of communication (10 miles to the main land supply route
and communication lines, 60 miles to the main supply staging area, 60 miles to
the supply depot and communication center.) A company-sized force of experienced
soldiers defends the beach with infantry and artillery. They are not expected to be
numerically reinforced but their experience level is assessed as increasing due to one-

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

112
for-one replacement with more experienced soldiers. CAS does not support them.
There are no known naval forces in the area. Coalition intelligence believes the Cains
consider this area a likely assault site. They rate the above landing zone assessment
as poor because of the inability to directly observe the area.
Location Delta is situated along the coast of Cain. It has a shallow beach slope,
fine-grained sand, and rocks on the shore side of the beach. The water adjacent to the
beach is of m oderate depth with a large tide range and a moderate undertow. A coral
reef extends the length of the surf zone. There are no known mines or obstructions
on the beach or in the water. The beach has adequate staging area for landing troops
and supplies. However, there are no adequate routes to access the Cains’ lines of
communication. Routes would have to be forged through the jungle area. (12 miles
to the main land supply route and communication lines, 100 miles to the main supply
staging area, 20 miles to the supply depot and communication center.) A company
sized force of novice soldiers defends the beach with infantry and artillery. They
are not expected to be reinforced and their experience level is assessed as decreasing
due to one-for-one replacement with less experienced soldiers. CAS does not support
them. There are no known naval forces in the area. Coalition intelligence believes the
Cains consider this area an unlikely assault site. They rate the above landing zone
assessment as good.
Based on the above assessments, your staff has recommended location Delta be
cause it is lightly defended, it has an adequate landing zone, and it has an element
of surprise. These outweigh the task of having to forge a path to the lines of commu
nication. You must either concur or order another course of action (COA).
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D e cisio n situ ation no. 2— The second decision facing you as the coalition
C JTF is approving the timing of the amphibious assault. There are four choices
th at will support the efforts of the land campaign, which will be ready to start in 36
hours and must commence within 96 hours to remain on their timetable. They are
summarized below.
36 Hours—The following is the expected level of readiness at this point. Troop
level will be at a marginal level with the minimum number of troops available for
a successful assault. Landing ship support is insufficient and will require twice the
number of reloads to land the required number of troops, equipment, and supplies.
Air support is sufficient. There are enough supplies to sustain the force for 30 days.
Weather forecast is for an overcast sky with light rain and fog. Wind and wave
height in the bay are moderate. The forces will have rehearsed the assault once and
are considered at a moderate state of training. There are no significant enemy troop
movements in the area. Coalition intelligence has no indication th at Cain is alerted
to the assault. You have both air and maritime superiority.
48 Hours—At this point, troop level will be at a sufficient level to easily assure
mission success. Landing ship support is still insufficient and will require about one
and a half times the number of reloads to land the required troops, equipment, and
supplies. Air support is sufficient. There are enough supplies to sustain the force
for 30 days. Weather forecast is for partly cloudy conditions with no precipitation
and good visibility. W ind and wave height are low. The forces will have rehearsed
the assault once and will be at a moderate state of training. There are no significant
enemy troop movements in the area. Coalition intelligence does not predict th at Cain
will be alerted to the assault. You have both air and maritime superiority.
72 Hours—At this point, troops remain at a sufficient level. Landing ship support
will be sufficient to land troops, equipment, and supplies in the desired time frame.
Supply levels are still rated as marginal with enough to sustain the force for 45 days.
W eather forecast is for clear skies with moderate wind and wave height but with
conditions expected to worsen over the course of the landing. This forecast is rated
poor because of a complex weather pattern th a t may affect the area. The forces will
have rehearsed the assault twice and will be at a high state of training. There are no
significant enemy troop movements in the area. Coalition intelligence estimates th at
the Cains will have a 25% probability of detecting the assault before it commences.
You have both air and maritime superiority.
96 Hours—At this point, troops, ships, and supplies will be at sufficient levels to
provide adequate support for the assault. Weather is expected to be overcast with
moderate rain, reduced visibility, strong winds, and moderate but increasing waves.
This forecast is rated poor because of a complex weather pattern th a t may affect the
area. The forces will have rehearsed the assault three times and will be at a high state
of training. There are no significant enemy troop movements in the area. Coalition
intelligence estimates th a t the Cains will have a 50% probability of detecting the
assault at this point. You have both air and maritime superiority.
Based on the above assessments, your staff recommends conducting the assault
48 hours from now based on maintaining the element of surprise, which is a sufficient
advantage to offset the insufficient ship level and marginal supply level. You must
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D ecisio n situ ation no. 3—-You have decided on the timing of the amphibious
assault and are within 24 hours of execution when your intelligence staff informs you
th at they have picked up indications of large Cain troop movements into the area
of the landing zone you have chosen. They estimate th at Cain troop strength will
reach a brigade plus level within 48 hours. The intelligence staff is unable to tell
if the Cains have been alerted to the assault or are moving the troops for further
staging elsewhere. All subordinate commanders indicate they can support an earlier
execution. A location change can also be supported with some risk of enemy alertment
and not completing the relocation in the allotted time. Your staff recommends moving
the start of the assault up by 12 hours and to continue on with the chosen landing
site. There is urgency in this decision because it must be coordinated with the land
campaign force plans and with air force air support for the landing. You must either
concur with your staff’s recommendation or order a different COA.
D ecision situ a tio n no. 4— Your troops have successfully landed on the beach
with only minor personnel and equipment casualties. As Task Force Gator begins to
move towards its objective, it comes under intense fire. It appears th at intelligence
underestimated the enemy troop strength, which now is at least two brigades. The
enemy seems to have waited until you were ashore to fully engage. The task force’s
forward progress is stopped and they begin taking heavy casualties with the casualty
rate increasing. Air strikes have not improved the situation. For the moment, the
task force is holding its position, but it is unclear if it will be able to overcome the
opposition. Enemy casualties have also been high. Naval forces are still in place to
affect a rapid withdrawal of personnel with no estimated increase in casualty rate.
Your staff recommends abandoning the assault and withdrawing the troops back to
their ships. You must either concur with your staff’s recommendation or order a
different COA.
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D ecision Situation D a ta S heet
D e c is io n :________________________
1. W hat information (scenario variables or conditions) did you use in making this
decision?
2. Based on this information, what were your expectations?
3. W hat were your specific goals and objectives for this decision?
4. Did you consider any other COAs than were provided by your staff? If so, what
were they and why did you consider them?
5. How was this decision selected/other options rejected? Did you follow a rule
for selection?
6. Did you imagine the possible consequences of this action? If so, what were those
consequences? Did you imagine the events th at would unfold? If so, what were
those events?
7. W hat knowledge or information might have helped make this decision easier?
8. Were you reminded of any previous experience? If so, please describe how it
was similar to this scenario.
9. Does this case fit a standard or typical scenario? Does it fit a scenario you were
trained to deal with?
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C

ODU IRB INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENT
IN F O R M E D C O N S E N T D O C U M E N T
O LD D O M IN IO N U N IV E R S IT Y

P R O J E C T T IT L E : Modeling the Decision Process of a Joint Taskforce Com
mander
IN T R O D U C T IO N The purposes of this form are to give you information th at
may affect your decision whether to say YES or NO to participation in this research,
and to record the consent of those who say YES. This project is concerned with
modeling the decision process of a Joint Taskforce Commander. To validate the
model’s performance, we must compare the model’s results against decisions made
by hum an role players. Because of your military background, you have been asked
to make a series of decisions th at will be used for comparison against the model’s
output.
R E S E A R C H E R S This research is being conducted by John Sokolowski, a PhD
candidate in the Modeling and Simulation program of Old Dominion University’s
College of Engineering and Technology.
D E S C R IP T IO N O F R E S E A R C H S T U D Y Many military simulations ex
ist. However, they are lacking in their ability to accurately model human decision
making. This is especially true for the operational level of warfare. This research
hopes to produce an accurate model of the decision process th at experienced decision
makers employ to arrive at decisions in time constrained and volatile environments.
If you decide to participate, then you will join a study involving research into
modeling military decisions at the operational level of warfare made by senior military
commanders. If you say YES, then your participation will last for approximately
2 hours at the location designated by your command. Approximately 30 military
officers in the ranks of 0 4 to 0 6 will be participating in this study. You will be given
a decision scenario, which will ask you to make 4 decisions based on the information
presented in the scenario. You will also be asked to explain your reasoning behind
the decisions you chose and the factors th at influenced th a t decision. In addition to
the decision scenario, you will also be given a personality questionnaire th at will help
measure your risk tolerance. This measurement will be used as an input to the model
to help capture your risk personality trait.
E X C L U S IO N A R Y C R IT E R IA Only those military officers in the ranks of
0 4 to 0 6 with operational military experience have been asked to participate in this
study.
R IS K S A N D B E N E F IT S RISKS: There are no known risks involved with par
ticipation in this study. However, as with any research, there may be risks th at have
not yet been identified.
BENEFITS: There are no direct benefits to you, however your participation in
this study will help provide for a more accurate model of decision-making th at may
be incorporated into military simulations to improve training, analysis, and experi
mentation at all levels of warfare.
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C O S T S A N D PA Y M E N T S The researchers are unable to give you any pay
ment for participating in this study.
N E W IN FO R M A T IO N If the researchers find new information during this
study th a t would reasonably change your decision about participating, then they will
give it to you.
C O N F ID E N T IA L IT Y The researchers will take reasonable steps to keep pri
vate information, such as personality traits confidential. No personal identifying data
will be linked to any results of this study. Only a tracking number will be used to
correlate data. The results of this study may be used in reports, presentations, and
publications but the researcher will not identify you.
W IT H D R A W A L PR IV IL E G E It is OK for you to say NO. Even if you say
YES now, you are free to say NO later, and walk away or withdraw from the study
at any time. Your decision will not affect your relationship with Old Dominion
University or your parent command.
C O M P E N S A T IO N FO R ILLNESS A N D IN JU R Y If you say YES, then
your consent in this document does not waive any of your legal rights. However, in
the event of problems arising from this study, neither Old Dominion University nor
the researchers are able to give you any money, insurance coverage, free medical care,
or any other compensation for such injury. In the event th at you suffer injury as a
result of participation in any research project, you may contact John Sokolowski at
686-6215 or Dr. David Swain the current IRB chair at 683-6028 at Old Dominion
University, who will be glad to review the m atter with you.
V O L U N T A R Y C O N S E N T By signing this form, you are saying several things.
You are saying th at you have read this form or have had it read to you, th at you are
satisfied th a t you understand this form, the research study, and its risks and benefits.
The researchers should have answered any questions you may have had about the
research. If you have any questions later on, then the researchers should be able to
answer them: John Sokolowski at 757-686-6215
If at any time you feel pressured to participate, or if you have any questions about
your rights or this form, then you should call Dr. David Swain, the current IRB chair,
at 757-683-6028, or the Old Dominion University Office of Research and Graduate
Studies, at 757-683-3460.
And importantly, by signing below, you are telling the researcher YES, th a t you
agree to participate in this study. The researcher should give you a copy of this form
for your records.
S u b ject’s P rin ted N am e & Signature

D a te

IN V E S T IG A T O R ’S ST A T E M E N T I certify th at I have explained to this
subject the nature and purpose of this research, including benefits, risks, costs, and
any experimental procedures. I have described the rights and protections afforded
to human subjects and have done nothing to pressure, coerce, or falsely entice this
subject into participating. I am aware of my obligations under state and federal laws,
and promise compliance. I have answered the subject’s questions and have encouraged
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him /her to ask additional questions at any time during the course of this study. I
have witnessed the above signature (s) on this consent form.
In v estig a to r’s P rin ted N am e & Sig
nature

D ate
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D

PERSONALITY MEASUREMENT QUESTIONNAIRE
I n s tr u c tio n s for C o m p le tin g th e E P IP -N E O S h o rt F orm

On the following pages, there are phrases describing people’s behaviors. Please use
the rating scale below to describe how accurately each statem ent describes you.
Describe yourself as you generally are now, not as you wish to be in the future.
Describe yourself as you honestly see yourself, in relation to other people you know of
the same sex as you are, and roughly your same age. So th at you can describe yourself
in an honest manner, your responses will be kept in absolute confidence. Please read
each statem ent carefully, and then circle the number th at corresponds to the number
on the scale below.
R e sp o n se O p tio n s Very Inaccurate Moderately Inaccurate Neither Inaccurate
nor Accurate Moderately Accurate Very Accurate
Am the life of the party.
Feel little concern for others.
Am always prepared.
Get stressed out easily.
Have a rich vocabulary.
Don’t talk a lot.
Am interested in people.
Leave my belongings around.
Am relaxed most of the time.
Have difficulty understanding abstract ideas.
Feel comfortable around people.
Insult people.
Pay attention to details.
Worry about things.
Have a vivid imagination.
Keep in the background.
Sympathize with others’ feelings.
Make a mess of things.
Seldom feel blue.
Am not interested in abstract ideas.
Start conversations.
Am not interested in other people’s problems.
Get chores done right away.
Am easily disturbed.
Have excellent ideas.
Have little to say.
Have a soft heart.
Often forget to put things back in their proper place.
Get upset easily.
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Do not have a good imagination.
Talk to a lot of different people at parties.
Am not really interested in others.
Like order.
Change my mood a lot.
Am quick to understand things.
Don’t like to draw attention to myself.
Take tim e out for others.
Shirk my duties.
Have frequent mood swings.
Use difficult words.
Don’t mind being the center of attention.
Feel others’ emotions.
Follow a schedule.
Get irritated easily.
Spend time reflecting on things.
Am quiet around strangers.
Make people feel at ease.
Am exacting in my work.
Often feel blue.
Am full of ideas.
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12345
12345
12345
12345
12345
12345
12345
12345
12345
12345
12345
12345
12345
12345
12345
12345
12345
12345
12345
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E

TURING TEST INSTRUCTIONS

M o d elin g th e D ecision P rocess o f a Joint Task Force Com m ander
The U.S. military is relying more and more on large scale simulation systems as
a tool to provide for force training, war plan analysis, and new concept experimenta
tion. An im portant element within these systems is their ability to simulate military
decision-making. Legacy simulations have modeled decisions at the tactical level of
warfare b u t very little decision-making has been modeled at the operational level.
To improve on operational decision modeling, a research effort was undertaken to
develop a computer model th at would mimic the cognitive decision process of senior
military commanders in an operational setting. Specifically, a system was created to
model the decision process of a Joint Task Force Commander (CJTF). The model
was tested by comparing decisions it produced against decisions produced by military
officers playing the role of a C JTF using a typical operational decision scenario.
As a final step in the validation process, you are being asked to further evaluate
if one can tell the difference between a set of decisions made by human role players
and a set of decisions made by a computer simulation. The following pages contain
an operational decision scenario consisting of four decision points. This scenario
was provided to thirty military officers in the grades of 0-4 to 0-6, each with joint
operational experience. They were asked to make a decision on each decision point
as if they were the CJTF. Their decisions had to be based only on the information
provided in the scenario and their past experience as military officers.
The computer model was provided with the same decision scenario and was asked
to generate its decisions as if it were these thirty role players. Note, the model was not
programmed to produce optimal decisions but to mimic the human decision process
th a t is influenced by a person’s experience and the unclear and incomplete data th at
is often present in real world military operations.
The last page of this document contains a scoring sheet with twenty sets of deci
sions. This set of decisions was chosen from among the thirty role player decision sets
and thirty model decision sets. Each decision set represents the sequence of decisions
required by the enclosed scenario. Next to each decision set is a block to indicate your
evaluation of th a t decision set. Clicking on the block next to your choice will place
an x in it, indicating your evaluation. Please ensure th at only one block is checked
for each decision set.
Following the decision table is a block for comments. If you felt you were able to
identify human vs. computer decisions, please explain in the comment block what
indicators you used to make this differentiation. Once complete, please save this
document back to its original file. This will save your responses. Thank you for your
time in completing this evaluation. Your effort will help improve joint force training,
analysis, and experimentation.
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D ecision set num ber one
L o c a tio n
Bravo
Bravo
Bravo
Delta
Bravo
Charlie
Bravo
Charlie
Charlie
Bravo
Delta
Delta
Bravo
Bravo
Bravo
Bravo
Bravo
Delta
Bravo
Bravo

T im in g
48 hours
48 hours
48 hours
48 hours
48 hours
48 hours
48 hours
48 hours
48 hours
48 hours
48 hours
48 hours
48 hours
48 hours
48 hours
48 hours
48 hours
36 hours
48 hours
48 hours

C hange
go early
on time
go early
go early
go early
on time
go early
go early
go early
on time
go early
go early
go early
go early
go early
go early
on time
another site
on time
go early

W ith d ra w
withdraw
withdraw
continue
continue
continue
withdraw
continue
continue
continue
continue
continue
continue
continue
withdraw
withdraw
withdraw
continue
withdraw
continue
continue

E v a lu a tio n
human computer
human computer
human computer
human computer
human computer
human computer
human computer
human computer
human computer
human computer
human computer
human computer
human computer
human computer
human computer
human computer
human computer
human computer
human computer
human computer

can’t
can’t
can’t
can’t
can’t
can’t
can’t
can’t
can’t
can’t
can’t
can’t
can’t
can’t
can’t
can’t
can’t
can’t
can’t
can’t
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tell
tell
tell
tell
tell
tell
tell
tell
tell
tell
tell
tell
tell
tell
tell
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D ecision set num ber tw o
L o c a tio n
Bravo
Bravo
Bravo
Delta
Bravo
Charlie
Bravo
Charlie
Charlie
Bravo
Delta
Delta
Bravo
Bravo
Bravo
Bravo
Bravo
Delta
Bravo
Bravo

T im in g
48 hours
48 hours
48 hours
48 hours
48 hours
48 hours
48 hours
48 hours
48 hours
48 hours
48 hours
48 hours
48 hours
48 hours
48 hours
48 hours
48 hours
36 hours
48 hours
48 hours

C hange
go early
on time
go early
go early
go early
on time
go early
go early
go early
on time
go early
go early
go early
go early
go early
go early
on time
another site
on time
go early

W ith d ra w
withdraw
withdraw
continue
continue
continue
withdraw
continue
continue
continue
continue
continue
continue
continue
withdraw
withdraw
withdraw
continue
withdraw
continue
continue

E v a lu a tio n
human computer
human computer
human computer
human computer
human computer
human computer
human computer
human computer
human computer
human computer
human computer
human computer
human computer
human computer
human computer
human computer
human computer
human computer
human computer
human computer

can’t
can’t
can’t
can’t
can’t
can’t
can’t
can’t
can’t
can’t
can’t
can’t
can’t
can’t
can’t
can’t
can’t
can’t
can’t
can’t
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tell
tell
tell
tell
tell
tell
tell
tell

126

CURRICULUM VITA
for

JOHN ANTHONY SOKOLOWSKI
D E G R E E S:
Doctor of Philosophy (Engineering with a Concentration in Modeling and Simu
lation), Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA, May 2003
M aster (Engineering Management), Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA, May
1998
Bachelor of Science (Computer Science), Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN,
December 1974
P R O F E SSIO N A L C H RO NO LO G Y:
Virginia Modeling, Analysis and Simulation Center, Old Dominion University, Nor
folk, VA
Project Scientist, December 2001-Present
Joint Warfighting Center, U. S. Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, VA
Head, Modeling and Simulation Division, March 1999-November 2001
Naval Safety Center, Norfolk, VA
Head, Afloat Safety Directorate, October 1995-February 1999
Commander, Submarine Squadron Eight, Norfolk, VA
Deputy Commander, January 1994-September 1995
USS Benjamin Franklin (SSBN 640), Charleston, SC
Commanding Officer, July 1991-December 1993
SC IE N T IFIC A N D P R O F E SSIO N A L SO C IETIES M E M B E R SH IP :
Society for Modeling and Simulation International, American Association for Artifi
cial Intelligence, Association for Computing Machinery, Phi Beta Kappa
G R A N T S A N D C O N T R A C T S AW ARDED:
Decision Modeling, Sponsor: Joint Warfighting Center/Defense Modeling and Simu
lation Office, $146,000
SCH O LARLY A C T IV IT IE S C O M PLET ED :
Sokolowski, J. A. Enhanced Military Decision Modeling Using a MultiAgent System
Approach. In P ro ce ed in g s o f th e 1 2 th C o n feren ce on B e h a v io r R e p r e s e n ta tio n in
M o d elin g a n d S im u la tio n (B R IM S ). May 12-15, 2003, Scottsdale, AZ, (accepted for
publication).
Sokolowski, J. A. Representing Knowledge and Experience in RPDAgent. In P ro ceed 
in g s o f the 1 2 th C o n feren ce on B e h a v io r R e p r e s e n ta tio n in M o d e lin g a n d S im u la tio n
(B R IM S ).

May 12-15, 2003, Scottsdale, AZ, (accepted for publication).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

127
Sokolowski, J. A. Can a Composite Agent be Used to Implement a RecognitionPrim ed Decision Model? In P roceedin gs o f th e E le v e n th C o n feren ce on C o m p u te r
G e n e r a te d F orces a n d B e h a v io ra l R e p r e se n ta tio n . May 7-9, 2002, Orlando, FL, pp.
473-478.
Sokolowski, J. A. Using Neural Networks to Model Decision Making. In P roceed in g s
o f th e A d v a n c e d S im u la tio n Techn ology C on feren ce. April 16-20, 2000, Washington
D. C., pp. 131-135.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

